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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research is to address how geopolitical factors influence the
foreign policies of states in the South Caucasus. Due to the recent Russia-Georgia War, this
region is central to contemporary foreign policy, fueling discussions of a New Cold War
between the US and Russia. With the explicit goal to provide policy relevant research on
this critical region, the South Caucasus states (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) are
examined in three separate case studies.
Utilizing qualitative analysis of historical event data, each case examines the role of
five different variables: energy resources, routes, demography, proximity, and state
leadership. That research reveals several corollary relationships. First, demographic
(ethnic/religious) cleavages are found to define the borders of separatist conflicts and to be
positively correlated with state perceptions of threat that follow from the proximity of
foreign powers to separatist regions. Energy resources and routes define economic conflict
and are positively correlated with perceptions of threat resulting from the proximity of
foreign powers to these strategic points. Finally, state leadership is correlated with the value
placed on demographic groups, resources, and routes in the foreign policies of the South
Caucasus states and the subsequent balance of threat behavior exhibited in each state‟s
foreign policy orientation.
These findings are consequential for the discipline of International Relations,
demonstrating the contemporary relevance of geopolitical variables. Specifically, the
synthesis of these variables provides significant explanations of where, with whom, and
why conflicts have emerged in the South Caucasus. Answering those questions is a vital
step toward furthering the relevance of academic research for policy makers.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2008, international attention was ripped from the Olympics in
Beijing when war erupted between Russia and Georgia. As news reports spilled in, it
became clear that the Georgian military had attempted to seize control of the separatist
region of South Ossetia. Russia, having already deployed troops to maintain the
independence of this enclave, responded with overwhelming military force. Russian troops
streamed across the border, rapidly repulsing the Georgian military and cutting the country
in half as Russian tanks drove deep into Georgian territory. Alarmed by the massive and
prolonged Russian response, the West (particularly the US) clamored for a halt to the
violence.
While refraining from direct intervention, the US response included sending
warships to the Black Sea and mobilizing humanitarian aid in support of Georgia.1 The
crisis raised hackles in both Russia and the US, leading some to speculate on the
emergence of a New Cold War between these two old foes. For now the crisis has
decelerated, grinding to a halt as terms dictated by Russia impose a new equilibrium on the
defeated Georgian state. Yet questions about the war‟s underlying causes and future
implications remain, hanging in the air like the smoke of spent guns.
The gravest implications of this crisis are faced by the states of the South Caucasus.
(See Appendix A for a political map.) Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia occupy an
uncertain geographical space that has been the frontier of Iranian, Ottoman, Tsarist, and
Soviet empires. Today the Caucasus is once again in uncertain times, and the purpose of
this work is to address how this geopolitical environment may influence the foreign policy
behavior of the South Caucasus states.
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Thesis
The troubled history of the region reveals that the South Caucasus states occupy a
singularly tenuous geographic space. Therefore, geopolitical analysis is particularly suited
to explain policy making in the South Caucasus. While this work is designed to
demonstrate the relevance of geopolitical factors for the practice and relevance of
International Relations (IR) today, it bears stressing that this research is not an attempt to
create a new theory of geopolitics or to reduce foreign policy to deterministic set of
geopolitical laws. The developing literature on geopolitics has clearly demonstrated that
geographic and spatial factors are generally limited to passive, constraining roles.2 Still, to
dismiss this role is to dismiss a significant explanation of where and with whom conflicts
of interest are likely to occur in IR.
In order to investigate the role of geopolitical variables, the geopolitical approach to
IR must be re-examined, its limitations clearly stated, and key geopolitical factors
identified and defined. With these goals in mind, this work investigates the manner in
which foreign policy formulation may be influenced by the intersection of geopolitical
constraints and state leadership. Examining the interplay between these two sets of
variables allows the significance of geopolitical factors to be tested while discarding the
historical determinism of the geopolitical approach. The removal of determinism from
geopolitical analysis is directly facilitated by the inclusion of the variable of state
leadership, rendering the assumption of rational behavior is unnecessary. Vis-à-vis this
approach, a broader and deeper understanding of contemporary South Caucasus geopolitics
may be grasped by IR scholars and policy makers alike.
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Significance of Research
Geopolitical analysis of the Caucasus illuminates the role of historical patterns of
conflict between great powers in the South Caucasus. There is a lengthy collection of
literature on this topic, ranging from the era of the Great Game to the so-called “New Cold
War,” to which this research may contribute. Furthermore, this project contributes to the
literature on geopolitics – a theoretical approach that is experiencing a renaissance in IR.
The revival of geopolitics is not merely an attempt to reclaim basic geographic
factors that influence international politics, but is also an attempt to return policy relevance
to IR.3 Geopolitical concepts and terminology are readily received by policy makers,
offering the means to bridge the growing vocabulary gap between academics and
practitioners. However, geopolitical analysis should not merely be adopted on the merits
that policy makers relish the color inherent in geopolitical jargon. Because of its spatial
nature, geopolitical analysis is vital to identifying locations and actors with whom strategic
interests coincide in international politics. Policy makers desperately require this sort of
spatial information in order to know where to direct their activities, whether or not their
purpose is to mitigate conflicts or to emerge victorious in a conflict.
Geopolitics also demands academic attention precisely because without it
geopolitical jargon becomes solely the possession of politicians and the news media.
Rigorous testing of the explanatory value of geopolitical variables and their definitions is
necessary to prevent the abuse of geopolitical concepts. This research contributes to these
goals via a comprehensive examination of significant geopolitical factors. Therefore, this
work is positioned to simultaneously enrich existing literature on the Caucasus, the
geopolitical approach in IR, and the relationship between academics and policy makers.
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Research Question, Variables, & Hypotheses
Research Question
What specific geopolitical factors, taken into consideration with state leadership,
demonstrate a significant constraining role in the formulation of the foreign policies of the
South Caucasus states?
Variables
This research will examine five different variables. The first is the variable of state
leadership. Each state leader of the South Caucasus states since their independence may be
classified as pragmatic semi-authoritarians or idealistic nationalists. In addition to the
variable of state leadership, four different geopolitical variables will be examined. These
variables are: (1) energy resources, (2) routes, (3) demography, and (4) proximity of
foreign powers. For the purposes of this research, energy resources are defined as oil and
natural gas. The variable, routes, is a broad term that encompasses roads, railways,
waterways, airways, and energy pipelines. Demography refers to the physical distribution
and composition of ethnicities and religious groups among a state‟s population, while the
“proximity of foreign powers” refers to the physical distance of other states from a given
state‟s resources, routes, and demographic groups. Each of these variables will be further
defined and defended in the literature review section of this research.
Hypotheses
This work argues that the distribution of energy resources, routes, and demography
in the South Caucasus creates strategic points of interest for states, and that these strategic
points of interest invite an overlap of international interests that indicate locations that are
4

likely to experience conflict. The proximity of foreign powers to these strategic points of
interest contributes to an understanding of which actors those conflicts might involve. Still,
these geopolitical factors only provide necessary, but not the sufficient, cause for the
development of conflicts. They answer the questions of where and with who interests
collide, but are generally insufficient answers for when, why, and how conflicting interests
are handled. Thus, the variable of state leadership is necessary to include as it can explain
why states may respond to similar geopolitical environments and overlapping interests in
different ways.
The first hypothesis of this research is that, as the strategic importance of energy
resources, routes, and demographic groups increases, these variables create locations where
conflict is increasingly likely to develop. As a caveat to this, however, the coincidence of
international interests in a strategic area should not be assumed to produce conflict by
default. Conflict will result when one state perceives another to be a threat. There is a
significant geographic component to the perception of threat, and that is the physical
distance or proximity of a foreign power. Therefore, the second hypothesis of this research
is that: as the proximity of a foreign power to a given state‟s strategic energy resources,
routes, or demographic groups increases, that given state is increasingly likely to engage in
balance of threat behavior. Finally, this research hypothesizes that state leadership is a
significant variable for the explanation of how the South Caucasus state pursue foreign
policies within their geopolitical environment. Idealistic nationalist leaders are believed to
be more likely to engage in conflicts over energy resources, routes, and demographic
groups than pragmatic semi-authoritarians. (After the following section on this work‟s
methodology, a comprehensive description of these variables and the case for their
inclusion in this model will be developed in the Literature Review.)
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Methodology
This research employs a deductive method of qualitative research, testing the
proposed hypotheses across three case studies. Each South Caucasus state will be examined
in a case study, starting with Azerbaijan, proceeding to Armenia, and concluding with
Georgia. That order was selected, not to favor one state over another, but in order to
develop a natural flow of analysis. Beginning research with a case study of Azerbaijan
allows the central importance of Azerbaijan‟s oil and natural gas resources to be
immediately established. Since Azerbaijan is treated first, that case study is also the
longest, not because Azerbaijan necessarily requires more attention, but because that case
will establish elements of the region‟s history and geopolitical patterns that the subsequent
cases will not have to re-address. In the chapter on Azerbaijan, the war between that state
and Armenia will be discussed, so it is natural that the following chapter treat Armenia, as a
discussion of the war between these two states has already begun. Finally, concluding with
the Georgian case allows this research to return to the most current geopolitical events
defining the South Caucasus – fallout from the Russia-Georgia War and new US-Russia
tensions.
Each case study proceeds in a longitudinal fashion, utilizing historical event data
analysis. An overview of each state‟s pre-Soviet history is provided first, in order to
establish an understanding of the larger historical context of the South Caucasus. This is
followed by a brief examination of the Soviet history of each state, as the Soviet legacy has
proven to have enduring consequences for the region, particularly in regards to routes and
demography. Immediately after independence, all three states were involved in
ethnic/religious separatist conflicts, so each case study begins its examination of the South
Caucasus states since their independence with an examination of demography‟s role in
6

separatism. This is followed by an examination of the economic conditions in each state
(which specifically addresses energy resources and routes). In each case, a third section
follows, in which different, state-specific trends are examined because of the importance of
their relation to each state‟s key geopolitical variables and leadership in the literature of IR.
For Azerbaijan, this state-specific trend is the resurgence of Islam. For Armenia, it is the
role of the Armenian Diaspora. And for Georgia, it is the democratic “Rose Revolution.”
After a complete overview of the South Caucasus states since independence, their
contemporary geopolitical environment is examined, in order to cement an understanding
of the proximity of foreign powers and the role of leaders in foreign affairs. This section
takes into account each state‟s foreign policy orientations, with regional neighbors in the
South Caucasus, the extra-regional powers of Iran and Turkey, and the global powers of the
EU, US, and Russia. By moving from a local to a global perspective, examination of the
geopolitical environment from the perspective of each South Caucasus state is encouraged
and to emphasize the role of proximity.
Literature Review: Theoretical & Historical Foundations
Geopolitics & Policy Relevance
As previously noted, a worthy reason to re-examine the promise of geopolitical
analysis in IR is the relevance it holds for policy making. On the topic of policy relevance,
Alexander George and Richard Smoke are two notable theorists to have attempted to
pursue usable knowledge in the field of IR.4 More recently, however, the standard of policy
relevance has been taken up by Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic. Lepgold and Nincic
argue that scholarship in IR is running the risk of becoming an insular discipline, irrelevant
to the reality of international affairs.
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Originally, this was not the case. Research in the discipline has long been driven by
external sources, and this has contributed to policy relevant work in areas such as
“deterrence, nuclear proliferation, arms control, and the use of coercive force.”5 The
professionalization of IR, however, has weakened external influence, and caused research
to be reordered to demands originating from within the academy. This is a trend that
deserves moderating, as growing internal generation of research agendas may be
continuing beyond its healthy bounds. Specifically, the proliferation of subfields within IR
is threatening to compartmentalize IR scholars, leading them to lose sight of greater
realities and of the advances made elsewhere in the discipline.6
Reacting to these developments, former US Ambassador David D. Newsom was
quoted as saying that “…much of today‟s scholarship is irrelevant or inaccessible to policy
makers…much remains locked within the circle of esoteric scholarly discussion.”7 In large
part, the gap that Newsom has decried can be explained by the different professional
incentives and goals that exist for academics and practitioners. Policy makers are most
interested in variables they can influence or research that clearly relates to the practice of
policy, while scholars are freer to range over a broader topics and variables.8
This fact underpins one of the greatest objections made to the argument that IR
should make policy relevance a goal. Policy makers operate on short deadlines and require
quick solutions to contemporary international issues, which can incline them to favor
research that fits their pre-existing paradigms, to ignore variables that they have no
influence over, and to jump from correlations to conclusions of causation. Therefore,
subjugation of IR research agendas to the demands of policy relevance is oft objected to as
a threat to the independent and dispassionate analysis that makes IR a valuable social
science.
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Yet this is a weak, even isolationist position. IR does not need to abandon its
dispassion in order to be policy relevant. It is precisely because of the discipline‟s
dispassion and systematic approach to international problems that IR must engage in
research of policy relevance. If academics do not engage in policy relevant research,
policies will be solely influenced by research foundations, partisan think tanks, politicians,
and the news media. In the geopolitical approach to international affairs, policy relevance
and this need for scholarly rigor collide, providing an opportunity in which IR may reclaim
policy relevance and while establishing the value of its objectivity and rigor.
In his book, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change, Jakob Grygiel makes the
argument that geographic factors in IR are a vital component to policy relevant research.9
Because of its spatial nature, geopolitical analysis is vital to identifying locations and actors
with whom strategic interests coincide in international politics. Policy makers desperately
require this sort of spatial information in order to know where to direct their activities,
whether or not their purpose is to mitigate conflict or to triumph in it. Such information
addresses calls by Lepgold and Nincic for policy relevant research.
In addition, geopolitical analysis offers a possible solution to the growing
vocabulary gap between policy makers and academics. The discipline of IR is full of
technical language, jargon, and discipline specific terminology that policy makers find
difficult. Lepgold and Nincic propose that one way to bridge the gap would be to develop a
“common vocabulary.”10 It is quite common to hear policy makers, and even journalists,
use the terminology of geopolitics. Geopolitical concepts are understood and consistently
discussed in these circles. This might be capitalized upon to construct a common language
of geopolitics, allowing IR scholars to define geopolitical terminology that is often used in
a dangerously loose manner in popular discourse.
9

In this regard, geopolitics has a notorious history. In the Vietnam era, the Domino
Theory was an example of geopolitical logic that was overly simplistic and deterministic,
but exerted significant influence on US foreign policy.11 More recently, President George
W. Bush‟s usage of geopolitical rhetoric has come under similar criticism.12 If IR scholars
would re-engage geopolitics, they would be positioned to define geopolitical terminology
to curb such rhetoric and mitigate the loose application of geopolitical concepts.
Notorious History & Modern Evolution of Geopolitical Thought
The term “geopolitics” owes to Ruldolf Kjellen, a Swedish political scientist who
coined the phrase in 1899. This term “has often been taken to signify a hard-nosed or more
realistic approach to international politics that lays particular emphasis on the role of
territory and natural resources in shaping the condition of states.”13 As geography is a
physical “fact,” it constitutes an ever present variable with which states must reckon.
Because of the natural basis that geopolitics, then, has on physical “facts”, it was
conceptualized as “science” from which generalized “laws” might be derived.
Kjellen‟s science of geopolitics found a place among the imperial powers of Europe
during the 19th century – the era of the Great Game. The Great Game, a phrase attributed to
Arthur Conolly but popularized by Kipling, is a classic example of geopolitical power
balancing.14 During that era, Central Asia was witness to power balancing between the
British and Tsarist Russian empires in which Afghanistan served as a classic buffer state,
separating these two powers. Since then, Eurasia has always been central to geopolitical
conceptions.
Exemplifying the geopolitical thought that gripped Europe at the time are the
writings of Sir Halford John Mackinder. In 1904, Mackinder wrote a classic paper on
10

geopolitics entitled “The Geographical Pivot of History.”15 In it, he expressed the view that
the Eurasian core area could serve as the base for a continental power that would be
invulnerable to naval powers. This core could serve as a Pivot Area from which that landbased power could dominate both Europe and Asia. Later, Mackinder would refer to the
Pivot Area as the Heartland from which the globe might be dominated. Following this
logic, he issued the classic dictum that:
Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island
Who rules the World-Island commands the World16
One of the most prominent critics of Mackinder‟s theory was Nicholas Spykman.
He objected that Mackinder had placed undue emphasis on the advantages of the heartland
because internal, overland transportation was more difficult that Mackinder had assumed.
Second, he disputed the assumption that conflict was a simple matter of sea versus land
powers. Instead, Spykman called attention to what he would call the Rimland. He argued
that the real potential of Eurasia lay within the Rimland, an area that was vulnerable to both
land and sea powers. This led him to propose this counter to Mackinder:
Who controls the Rimland controls Eurasia
Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world17
Spykman would go on to argue that the Allies should direct their post-World War II
(WWII) power to preventing one power from ever securing control of the Rimland. A
similar line of thought shaped the containment policies of the Cold War.18 (See Appendix
B for a map of the Pivot Area and the Rimland.) Despite his influence on American policy
in the post-war era, however, geopolitical analysis largely fell out of favor with IR theorists
after WWII. This was in some regards due to the Nazi adoption and abuse of geopolitics.
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Kjellen‟s ideas had been quickly assimilated by German scholars and blended with
concepts of Social Darwinism. Friedrich Ratzel exemplified this approach, arguing that the
state was “super-organism,” rooted in the natural environment, and requiring secure living
space or “lebensraum.”19 Germany‟s defeat in WWI crushed German dreams of that day
but reinforced the assumption that Germany‟s geopolitical position in Europe required
military strength to preserve the integrity of the German homeland. Under Hitler,
Germany‟s military resurgence was coupled with the Ratzel‟s idea that Germany must
carve out living space in Europe, contributing to Nazi ideology.
The manner in which Nazi Germany brought geopolitical thought together with
Fascism and racism, led many American political scientists to denounce the discipline after
the war.20 However, there are other reasons for the decline of geopolitics as well. As
scholarship in IR moved away from the natural sciences and deepened as a social science,
focus shifted to human and political variables.21 This is an understandable, and even a
positive trend. However, this trend and the tarnished reputation of geopolitics has produced
the almost complete abandonment of geopolitics, which has contributed to the afore
mentioned decline in policy relevant research in IR.
The revival of geopolitics within the US is often accredited to Henry Kissinger. At
the very least, he returned the term “geopolitics” to usage within the setting of American
foreign policy.22 By the 1980s, geopolitics had become associated with American realist
thought and discussions of great power rivalries. Stephen Walt and Robert Jervis reintroduced geographic variables in what has come to be referred to as “defensive
realism.”23 Their brand of realism has been dubbed “defensive,” because they argue that
states seek to expand their power or to balance the power of other states only when they
feel insecure. For Stephen Walt, the “proximity” or physical between the territories of two
12

states was the variable that influenced the perception of threat between states which
resulted in power balancing.24 For Robert Jervis, a much wider range of geographic
variables were important, because he was focused primarily on how geography may
mitigate the effects of anarchy in some areas (providing protection by mountain ranges and
oceans, etc.) and emphasize the insecurities of an anarchic system in other areas (open, flat
country).25
While geopolitics is experiencing resurgence, it still retains its detractors. One of
the greatest criticisms is that globalization has made geographic factors irrelevant. In
Thomas Friedman‟s book, The World is Flat, he makes the argument that globalization is
leveling the world‟s playing field. As communication technology has brought the world
closer, Friedman argues that this integration is overriding geographic obstacles that once
separated the world‟s people.26
Friedman‟s argument is strongest when related to the economic sphere, where
international markets are clearly becoming more interdependent. Yet, even in this sphere
geography continues to play a role. The literature of International Political Economy speaks
of the North-South divide – the development gap between the wealthy, industrialized states
and the poor, agricultural states.27 A country‟s climate and topography influences its
agricultural product and even the distribution of production structures, including industry.
Additionally, distribution of natural resources influences a state‟s economic structure,
particularly in the case of those states endowed with oil and natural gas.28
While communication technology has made geographic distance less salient than in
previous ages, even the idea that the world is growing smaller has a vital spatial
component. Globalization and the communication revolution have simultaneously released
forces of localization and fragmentation, often along ethnic, cultural, and linguistic lines.29
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Quantitative research has demonstrated that “complex ethnic geography” is a significant
factor in the occurrence of the sort of internal violence that has emerged in the South
Caucasus.30 Citing French Historian Fernand Braudel‟s concept of “longue durée,”
Christoph Zürcher notes that physical geography does not set events in motion but shapes
the long-term historical structures that provide a constraining environment.31 Following this
line of argument, one comes to the conclusion that even constructivists and insitutionalists
in IR should take another look at the role of geography. In his book, Ethno-nationalism,
Islam and the state in the Caucasus, Moshe Gammer specifically argues institutions are not
a sufficient basis for an understanding of Caucasus politics because factors like ethnonationalism are so significant in shaping the political environment.32
Today, geopolitics is an approach that can couple traditional geographical factors
with the increasing complexities of a globalized world. If one refers to evolving French
literature on geopolitics, it is clear that geopolitical analysis may take into account the
influence of terrorist groups, corporations, languages, religions, ideologies, and other
regional and local groupings.33 At this point, then, it might be useful to provide a definition
of geopolitics. For the purposes of this thesis, a definition provided by Yves Lacoste will be
adopted. A recognized French scholar in the field of geopolitics, Lacoste defines
geopolitics as simply the “rivalry of powers over territories” (les rivalités de pouvoirs sur
des territoires).34 This broad definition allows for the incorporation of various political
actors who are exercising power in a specific geographic space.
At the same time that geopolitical analysis is becoming more nuanced in its
perception of political actors, it is also shedding its previous determinism and its reliance
on the logic of rational choice. Critical Geopolitics has emerged as a new school of thought
that embraces the importance of non-state actors, stresses the possibility of cooperation
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over conflict, while employing constructivism to explain how geopolitical perceptions may
influence decision making. In order to illustrate this point, scholars of Critical Geopolitics
have conceptualized three divisions of geopolitical culture.35 These categories are formal,
practical, and popular geopolitics. Each originates from academia, government, and the
media respectively. The following figure illustrates the manner in which these three
divisions of geopolitical thought emerge and conspire to shape perceptions and actions.

Categories of
Geopolitical
Thought

Media

Academia

Government

Popular

Formal

Practical

Melting Pot of Geopolitical Ideas

National Geopolitical Conception of
Self & Others
Figure 1: Construction of Geopolitical Conceptions

Synthesizing a New Geopolitical Approach in the South Caucasus
Following the arguments made in critical literature on geopolitics, this work
proposes that by producing policy relevant research in the realm of formal geopolitics, one
may influence the construction of practical geopolitics before it enters the greater “melting
pot of geopolitical ideas.” Thereby, the academy may increase its influence on the final
construction of national conceptions of self and other. The following figure demonstrates
this point.
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Figure 2: Academia & the Construction of Geopolitical Conceptions

As geopolitics has experienced its revival, other authors have made the argument
for the relevance of geopolitical and spatial factors. Though he is not from the critical
school of geopolitics, Grygiel‟s previously mentioned book on geopolitics is a prominent
piece of recent literature in this regard. In his attempt to remove ambiguity from the
geopolitical approach, he narrows his focus to what he claims are the three most significant
geopolitical variables. Recognizing that geopolitics is the combination of “geology and
human activities,” he directs his focus to: (1) the layout of trade routes, (2) the location of
resources, and (3) the nature of state border. He then tests the relevance of these three
variables across three different case studies of historically great powers: (1) the Venetian
Empire, (2) the Ottoman Empire, and (3) the Ming Dynasty in China.36
This research project mirrors his model by proposing three case studies, but it
differs in that it tests the relevance of geopolitical variables for modern states, not historical
empires. Moreover, by studying the states of the Caucasus, this work focuses on small
states, as opposed to great powers. This is important because geopolitical analysis has a
habit of focusing on the world‟s empires and superpowers, even though constraining effects
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of geopolitical factors are most likely to be most accentuated for small states. Synthesizing
a geopolitical approach in the South Caucasus, then, may serve the goal of policy relevance
and the goal of contemporary theoretical relevance. Due to differences in focus, Grygiel‟s
three variables provide a valuable starting point but are not completely suited to the
purposes of this work. Instead, this research will utilize Grygiel‟s first two variables
(resources and routes) and replace borders with an examination of demography and a
modified concept of Walt‟s proximity.
Energy Resources
Resources have long been identified as an essential interest of states, since the
mercantilist days of European empires until today.37 The uneven distribution of natural
resources around the globe makes some regions more strategic than others. As IR literature
has evolved, it has also become clear that natural resources are not the only resources that
matter. Both Hans Morgenthau and Robert Gilpin emphasize the importance of economic
(e.g. industrial) resources, when they argue that resources are a key proxy for state power.38
The manner in which states pursue resources has shifted from the days of colonialism, as
states understand that they no longer have to conquer resource areas in order to derive
power from them. Instead of conquering resource rich areas, states now attempt to access
them through market forces while also deriving power through the potential to deny critical
resources to others.39 Small states are especially vulnerable to the denial of critical
resources, as their small territories are less likely to provide self-sufficiency.40
Today‟s energy politics offer a case in point. Oil and gas deposits are concentrated
in only a few major regions of the world, making these areas and the states in them center s
of international interest. A state‟s self-sufficiency in regard to critical resources like energy
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is an important factor in a state‟s independence, and thus the exercise of its power.41 This
research may compliment existing IR literature, and Grygiel‟s work specifically, by
explicitly focusing on the role of energy resources in the geopolitics of the South Caucasus.
Such an approach is in keeping with this work‟s attempt to narrow the scope of Grygiel‟s
broad investigation of geopolitical variables.
Routes
Routes are another broadly accepted geopolitical variable. Mackinder‟s arguments
for the strategic value of a Eurasian pivot were largely based upon the advent of the
railroad, a technological change which added speed to land routes.42 Alfred Mahan is
famous for his emphasis of the importance of sea lanes, a point which Spykman embraced
in his counter to Mackinder‟s thesis.43 Today, super highways, air corridors, and energy
pipelines round out the list routes which facilitate trade, communication, and the
deployment of military force. The number and geographic distribution of routes can restrict
a state‟s trade, and influence its ability to project power. In particular, routes are closely
related to the ability to deny resources, as the exploitation of resources usually requires
routes. For instance, Russia‟s control over gas pipelines feeding Europe has given it
significant political leverage.44 The South Caucasus states have a limited number of routes
and very few neighbors through which routes might pass, so this variable demands analysis
(See Appendix I for a map of routes in the South Caucasus).
Demography
By focusing on demography, this research diverges from Grygiel‟s model. Grygiel
argues that state borders are important because a state must secure its borders before it can
being to project its power effectively.45 But in the case of the South Caucasus, the status of
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borders is inextricably linked to separatist conflicts, and those conflicts are related to
regional demography.46 All three South Caucasus states have been involved in separatist
conflicts since their independence, and in each instance, the separatist groups were defined
by ethnicity and/or religion.
While the South Caucasus occupies a very small geographic space it possesses a
startlingly heterogeneous demography. The territory occupied by these states is splintered
between a diverse mix of ethnic and linguistic groups and split between Muslim and
Christian populations. (Refer to Appendix G for a map of demography in the South
Caucasus.) This mix has emerged from the historic overlap of empires in the region, and
from the rugged geography of the Caucasus Mountains. (See Appendix C for a topographic
map of the Caucasus.)
It is important to stress that demographic heterogeneity is not a sufficient condition
to explain the cause(s) of ethnic, national, or religious violence. It merely provides the
necessary condition for the emergence of such conflicts. Yet research has revealed that in
cases of “complex ethnic geography,” where one ethnic group appears poised to become a
majority, there is a greater likelihood of conflict than in societies that are either highly
homogenous or so heterogeneous that it is impossible for one group to gain a majority.47
Furthermore, demographic cleavages have been shown to play an important role in the
pattern of conflict once violence has begun.48 (See Appendix H for a map of demographic
shifts produced by ethnic violence in the South Caucasus.) Because the separatist conflicts
in the South Caucasus have invited international intervention and separatist conflicts often
afford foreign powers leverage over the a concerned state, understanding the region‟s
demography is important to understanding how these conflicts may constrain foreign
policy.
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Proximity
The final geopolitical factor this research will consider is a nuanced conception of
Walt‟s variable of proximity. While physical distance is an easily quantifiable geographic
variable, it is too simplistic a variable to be much use. As Grygiel points out distance may
vary in nature. In the 1930s, Britain and France differed in their perceptions of the threat of
German power, even though they were roughly the same distance from Berlin. While
France is located on the European continent, Britain‟s distance from Germany was
accentuated by the geographic barrier of the English Channel. Additionally, Walt‟s
conception of proximity only incorporated the distance between homelands. As Grygiel‟s
analysis reveals, since states are not completely self-sufficient, they have interests that lie
beyond their homelands, namely resources and routes.49
The limitations of Walt‟s proximity, however, may be overcome by defining it as
the distance of foreign powers from the three geopolitical variables that this work has
identified as essential: (1) energy resources, (2) routes, and (3) demographic groups. It is
premature to abandon the concept of proximity because it not only contributes to an
understanding of what actors the foreign policies of the South Caucasus must be concerned
with, but also why the foreign policies of the South Caucasus look the way they do.
Proximity may contribute to the “why” of conflict in foreign policy because of its
link to perceptions of threat.50 Routes, energy resources, and demographic cleavages all
serve as strategic points of interest for foreign powers, which they may attempt to
manipulate in pursuit of power. Research has also revealed that geographic proximity to an
area of dispute is a significant predictor of war.51 Therefore, proximity appears to be a
central geopolitical variable in the conflicts of the South Caucasus today.
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State Leadership
While attempting to understand the influence of geopolitical variables, this paper is
not proposing a new geopolitical theory. Its purposes are to test the significance of these
variables in relation to foreign policy in order that they might be more broadly integrated
into IR theory. Mindful of the dangers of determinism, geopolitical factors have thus far
been primarily defined as constraining factors. They are not hypothesized to force state
leaders to make certain decisions, but rather provide environmental constraints that may
influence the goals that such actors pursue, the manner in which they pursue them, and the
success of their policies.
In order to avoid the narrow perspective of classical geopolitics, this work does not
assume a rational choice model, which has been increasingly challenged in IR literature.52
Stephen Walt has even argued that the lack of creativity in rational choice literature
endangers its relevance to real world issues.53 In lieu of rational choice, then, this paper
proposes another variable, state leadership. It has been said, “geographical conditions
determine largely where history is made but it is always man who makes it.”54 State
leadership, as defined by this work, is a state‟s president. This is a defensible position, as
each of the South Caucasus states has developed semi-authoritarian or hyper-presidential
systems, meaning that the office of the president possesses significant influence over
foreign policy.55
This research notes the role of every president in the foreign policy orientation of
his respective South Caucasus state. These presidents, despite their differences, may be
classified within to broad categories similar to the pragmatic-Revolutionary and idealistRevolutionary categories that Dr. Houman A. Sadri derived in his studies of revolutionary
states.56 The first category is that of what the author will refer to as the pragmatic semi21

authoritarians. These presidents were usually strong leaders in the communist party, except
for Ilham Aliyev, who inherited the presidency from his pragmatic, semi-authoritarian
father. As such, despite any nationalist feelings, leaders in this category generally have
acted with deference toward Russia, have sought to end violence in separatist conflicts,
behaving in a manner that tends to emphasize political and economic stability.
The other category of presidential leaders may be classified as idealistic
nationalists. These leaders were often out of step with the communist party in pursuit of
national independence and, except for the case of Armenian presidents, quick to part ways
with Russia. They exhibit a greater tendency towards idealism, a greater commitment to
military involvement in separatist movements, and often a willingness to sacrifice
economically for national goals.
The variable of state leadership allows this work to more accurately test the
explanatory power of geopolitical variables as constraints on foreign policy. If leaders from
different categories pursue different foreign policies within the same set of geopolitical
constraints, this may demonstrate the limits of geopolitical variables. The degree of success
each leader has in implementing foreign policy in that environment also offers insight into
geopolitical constraints, as is particularly evidenced in the following case of Azerbaijan.
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CHAPTER 2: AZERBAIJAN
Of the three South Caucasus states, Azerbaijan appears to have the brightest and
most dynamic future. As Zbigniew Brzezinski stated in his 1997 The Grand Chessboard,
Azerbaijan has become one of the world‟s strategic pivots.1 It is the largest of all the
Caucasus states, though it is a relatively small country of 86,100 square kilometers.2
Thanks to its geographical position, Azerbaijan is the only state in the region to have direct
access to the Caspian Sea and its hydrocarbon energy reserves, and according to the US
Energy Information Administration, Azerbaijan possesses the world‟s 19th largest oil
reserves, at an estimated 7 billion barrels. It also claims around 30,000 billion cubic feet of
natural gas reserves.3 The scarcity of energy reserves and the world‟s economic
dependency on oil, combine to make Azerbaijan a focal point of international interest.
Indeed, if Azerbaijan did not possess these natural resources, it is questionable if the United
States and the European Union would be as involved in the South Caucasus as they are
currently.
While energy wealth may be a blessing for Azerbaijan, this and other geographic
characteristics have constraining implications as well. (See Appendix D for a topographic
map of Azerbaijan.) Azerbaijan is landlocked, and dependent on pipelines passing through
Georgia to export its oil to international markets. Armenia and Azerbaijan have also
remained locked in a territorial dispute over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. These
circumstances demonstrate that even oil cannot allow Azerbaijan to escape its greater
geopolitical environment, and oil itself is a valuable resource that invites foreign interest.
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Geopolitical History of Azerbaijan in the Caucasus
Pre-Soviet Azerbaijan
The Azeri people have a long history in the South Caucasus.4 The earliest known
state to occupy the geographical space of the modern state of Azerbaijan is Caucasian
Albania. A German scholar, Johannes Rau has written that, “the Albanian‟s language
formed part of the north-eastern group of Caucasus languages,” and they “…are considered
one of the ancestors of the modern Azerbaijani people.”5 Caucasus Albania incorporated
tribes of Turkic origin, and in the pre-Islamic era, many were Christian6 The Islamization
of the area did not begin until 639-643 AD, as the Arabs expanded into the Caucasus.7
The Caucasus came under Seljuk rule in the 10th and 11th centuries, during which a
great numbers of Turkic peoples migrated to the area, gaining a clear ethnic majority in
what is now modern Azerbaijan and northern Iran. Despite the rise and fall of various
dynasties, the Turkish people remained the ethnically unifying force in Azerbaijan.8 Sunni
Islam was the dominant creed of the ruling Seljuks, but in Azerbaijan, Islam mixed with
pre-Islamic beliefs. Shamanistic, Christian, and Zoroastrian traditions produced a
syncretistic heritage in Azerbaijan, producing a mysticism that later facilitated the Azeri
embrace of Shia Islam, which is more tolerant of mysticism than Sunni Islam.9
As mystical Sufi sects took root, one sect known as the Safaiya emerged in the 15th
century. A “military brotherhood of Turkish nomads”, the Safavid dynasty established
itself in the city of Tabriz. Though Turkic in origin, this dynasty came into territorial
conflict with the Ottoman Empire, and although Sufism emerged from Sunni Islam, this
dynasty also embraced Shia Islam and laid the foundation for the Iranian state in Persia.10
Under the Safavid dynasty, Turko-Persian tensions became a defining geopolitical force in
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Azerbaijan. Yet, in battles with the Ottoman Empire there were few desertions of Turkish
Safavids to the Ottoman-Turkish enemy. Only in northern Azerbaijan, where the
population had remained Sunni, did the Safavid dynasty encounter popular opposition to its
rule. The Shia faith of the Safavids provided a bond with the Persians that proved stronger
than shared ethnicity with the Ottoman Turks.11 The Safavids steadily embraced Persian
culture, and in 1592, the Safavid court was relocated to the Persian city of Isfahan.12
In the 17th century, both the Safavid and Ottoman empires began to weaken. When
the Safavid dynasty finally fell, it left a political void and the Azeri Khanates developed
greater political autonomy. But another empire was emerging in the north. Russian
expansion into the Caucasus had begun in the second half of the 16th century, following
Tsar Ivan IV‟s capture of the Khanate of Astrakhan in 1556. After various advances and
retreats, from that date forward, Russia solidified its hold on the Northern Caucasus in
1774. In that year, Kabarda and North Ossetia were annexed from the Ottomans after the
Russian victories in the Russo-Turkish war.13
Russia‟s march across the Caucasus proved steady and irreversible. In 1801,
Georgia was officially annexed to Russia. Georgia was then followed by: Mingrelia (1803);
Imeretia and Guria (1804); the Khanates of Shirvan, Sheka, Shuragel, and Karabakh
(1805); Ossetia, the khanates of Kuba, Derbet, and Baku (1806); Abkhazia (1810); the
khanate of Talysh (1813); the south of Dagestan (1819); and the territory of eastern
Armenia, Erivan (1828).14 As Russia advanced, it fought two wars with the Persian Qajar
dynasty. Both wars (1804-1813 and 1826-1828) went badly for the Persians, and following
defeat in 1828, Persia surrendered the whole of the South Caucasus in the Treaty of
Turkmenchay. The Aras River became the border between Russia and Iran, leaving the
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majority of ethnic Azeris on the Iranian side.15 This border is still in existence today, and
has continued to complicate any conception of a cohesive Azeri nation.
Russia‟s dominance of northern Azerbaijan meant its steady integration into the
Russian empire, and “a key element of this integration policy was the Christianization of
Azerbaijan.”16 The close relationship between the Christian Armenians and the Tsarist
Russian Empire excited ethnic and religious tensions in the Caucasus that still persist. As
Armenians settled in Azerbaijan, conflicts developed with the indigenous Muslim-Turkish
population. This laid the foundation for the territorial conflict between the newly
independent states of Armenia and Azerbaijan in the 1990s and Azeri riots against
Armenians in 1905, 1917, 1988, and 1990.17
Soviet Azerbaijan
It was not until the advent of WWI that the Russian imposed status quo in the
Caucasus was seriously upset. Russia joined the Allies to confront the Ottoman Empire and
the Central Powers. At first, Russia‟s military fared well against the Ottomans, but the
Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 produced internal chaos that forced Russia to withdraw from
the war a year later. Following the collapse of the Tsarist Russian Empire, the Caucasus
was open to the Ottomans. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia were incorporated into the
Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR) in 1918, which was dissolved
only months later as each sought their own independent political identity.18
In May of 1918, Azerbaijan declared itself the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic
(ADR). Azerbaijan‟s independence was short-lived, however. The victorious Russian
communists quickly turned to restoring order in Russia‟s former territories, and by 1920,
the Communist Russian Red Army had retaken the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan became the
29

Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), and in 1922, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and
Georgia were all reintegrated, this time into the Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist
Republic (TSFSR).19
Ultimately, however, the Caucasus was divided along ethno-political lines as the
Soviets recognized these identities with various degrees of political autonomy.20 The
TSFSR was eventually abolished and separate Soviet Republics were created for each of
the three South Caucasus states. For Azerbaijan, Soviet treatment of the Nakhichevan and
Nagorno-Karabakh regions was momentous. Nakhichevan, “an Azerbaijani enclave
between Armenia and northwestern Iran”, was declared to be an SSR in its own right.
Because of territorial disputes already developing between Azerbaijan and Armenia, a
referendum of the people in Nakhichevan was taken in 1921. That measure of public
opinion revealed an overwhelming desire to be politically incorporated with Azerbaijan.
Nakhichevan‟s status was affirmed by the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Moscow and, again, by
the Treaty of Kars which was signed in 1921 by the three Transcaucasian states and
Turkey. Simultaneously, the Soviets granted similar autonomy to the Armenian populated
Nagorno-Karabakh region within Azerbaijan, creating a complicated set of ethno-national
political units that would lay the foundation for territorial conflict.21
As the Soviet Union engineered borders and demographics in the region, it also
intervened in other aspects of life. Under Stalin, the people of the Caucasus were forced to
learn Russian and the practice of religion was repressed. Azeris were relocated by the
Soviets from Armenia to other parts of Azerbaijan.22 The exploitive economic relationship
(a core-periphery relationship as dependency theorists would call it) began under Tsarist
Russia was perpetuated by the Soviets. Transportation and communication structures were
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all oriented around a North-South relationship between Moscow and Baku.23 In Azerbaijan,
specifically, oil infrastructure was oriented toward Russian needs. As a result, Russia has
historically dominated Azerbaijan‟s oil export routes, and thereby its oil resources.
Under the Soviets, a foundation for distrust between Azerbaijan and Iran was also
laid. During World War II, Iran had gambled for greater independence by collaborating
with Nazi Germany, much as the Ottoman Empire had backed Germany against Britain and
Russia in WWI. The Soviets responded by occupying Iranian Azerbaijan and encouraged
Azeris in northern Iran to succeed. In 1942, however, the Allied Powers had agreed to
respect Iran‟s territorial integrity. The resulting Soviet-American Crisis over Iranian
Azerbaijan, in many ways, constituted the beginning of the Cold War.24
In March of 1946, Soviet troops were to withdraw from Iran and restore its
territory. Instead, the Soviets expanded their occupation of Iran. It was in the midst of this
Soviet power play in the Caucasus that Churchill proclaimed that an “iron curtain” had
fallen across Soviet occupied lands. Vigorous protests by British and Americans, as well as
action by the newly created UN Security Council eventually convinced the Soviets to
withdraw their troops, but in return, Russia demanded stakes in Iran‟s oil. Following the
Soviet withdrawal, Azeri independence was quickly crushed by the Shah‟s forces, reestablishing the Aras River border and perpetuating the division of ethnic Azeris.25
Azerbaijan & Independence
On August 30, 1991, Azerbaijan declared its independence from the Soviet Union.
The new government was headed by Ayaz Mutalibov, a longtime party member who had
been appointed communist party leader under Gorbachev. Elections were held in 1992, but
were boycotted by the nationalist Azerbaijani Popular Front, allowing the more moderate
31

Mutalibov to maintain the presidency. Such political disunity weakened Azerbaijan
internally as Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh began their war for independence, a
disastrous conflict that would force Mutalibov to resign even before the year was out.
Nagorno-Karabakh
As previously noted, conflict between Armenians and Azeris, has its historical roots
in demographic changes that began under the Tsars. Armenians were encouraged by Russia
to immigrate into the South Caucasus and many settled in Nagorno-Karabakh. When
Azerbaijan and Armenia first emerged as independent states in 1918, violent competition
for territory erupted. After WWI, the Armenians had managed to secure control of
Zangenur and Nagorno-Karabakh, although the British forced Armenians to return
Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. Still, the Azeris were losing the demographic battle for
territorial control. In 1920, an Armenian rebellion drew Azeri forces away from their
borders, allowing the Russian Red Army to easily recapture Azerbaijan.
Under the Soviets, ethnic tensions were somewhat mitigated when NagornoKarabakh was declared an autonomous region within Azerbaijan. From 1923 until the
Soviet collapse, Nagorno-Karabakh would retain this autonomous but subordinate status.
Armenian demands for greater political recognition were largely ignored by the
Communist Party, leaving grievances to simmer. In 1988, the Armenian majority in
Nagorno-Karabakh made two different bids to separate from Azerbaijan.26 By that time,
both Armenians and Azeris knew that tensions were getting out of hand. Between
November and December of 1989, nearly 160,000 Azeris left Armenian territory and
180,000 Armenians left Azerbaijan.27
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In 1989, Armenia passed a resolution calling for the annexation of NagornoKarabakh, igniting anti-Armenian riots in Baku in what became known as Black January.28
Soviet troops repressed these riots brutally, but after the Moscow putsch in August of 1991,
Soviet military intervention on either side came to an end. Nagorno-Karabakh declared its
independence from Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan countered by dissolving the political
autonomy of the region.29
In January 1992, both Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to accept their Soviet borders
in order to join the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Yet
Karabakh Armenians were already in revolt with unofficial Armenian support. In February
of 1992, Armenian forces attacked the town of Khojali with support from elements of the
Soviet army‟s 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment, resulting in what the Human Rights Watch
would call “the conflict‟s largest massacre.”30 This disaster contributed to the resignation of
Azeri president Mutalibov.
By May of 1992, Armenian forces had captured the towns of Shusha and Lachin,
opening a strategic roadway across the mountains to Armenia. By this time it was
becoming evident that Armenia was supporting the war for Karabakh independence, and
the newly elected Azeri president, Abulfaz Elchibey, who was a popular nationalist,
declared this a “war of aggression against Azerbaijan.”31 Elchibey‟s popularity did not
translate into victories, however, and as the Armenians began to advance beyond NagornoKarabakh, it became clear that Azerbaijan needed external intervention to bring an end to
the conflict.32 The West supported peace talks through the OSCE, but was unwilling to
intervene militarily, leaving the security of South Caucasus to Russia. Negotiations with
Russia were necessary, then, to bring an end to the conflict. Elchibey‟s stark nationalistic
33

attitude, however, led him to adopt anti-Russian rhetoric. During his 13 months in office,
he showed a remarkable lack of “diplomatic tact” and even managed to anger Iran by
discussing unification with Azeri‟s in northern Azerbaijan.33
Angering Russia and Iran was disastrous for Azerbaijan, leaving it with no allies
among its immediate neighbors. (Turkey only shares a border with isolated Nakhichevan).
Soon, 20 percent of Azerbaijani‟s territory had been invaded by Armenian forces.34 Each
defeat degraded Elchibey‟s popularity and threatened the integrity of the young Azeri state.
In the internal chaos an Azeri colonel, Suret Husseinov, staged an insurrection. To avoid a
coup, Elchibey turned over his legislative powers to Haydar Aliyev, Azerbaijan‟s former
communist party boss. On June 18, 1993, Elchibey fled Baku and Aliyev was elected the
president shortly afterwards.35
Aliyev quickly deferred to Russia, making a personal visit to Moscow in 1993 and
returning Azerbaijan to membership in the Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS).36
In return, Russia intervention brought Armenian forces to a halt. To counter Armenian
claims to the right of self-determination, Aliyev turned to arguments based on international
legitimacy and respect for territorial integrity. This stance simultaneously provided
Azerbaijan a legal footing in the international dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh while
allowing Aliyev to reconcile with Iran. By championing territorial integrity over selfdetermination, Aliyev, in effect, gave up claims to Iranian Azerbaijan.37
The Russian designed Bishkek Protocol of May 1994 brought an end to fighting
that had cost Azerbaijan an estimated 60 billion dollars in damage, nearly 30,000 dead, 1.3
million displaced, and 16 percent of its territory.38 Since then, the conflict has remained
largely frozen. Armenian forces continue to occupy a buffer zone around Nagorno34

Karabakh, Azerbaijan will not recognize Karabakh independence, and Armenia will not
agree to anything less than Azerbaijan‟s surrender of the territory.
Haydar Aliyev‟s pragmatic rhetoric on Nagorno-Karabakh has been repeated by his
son, Ilham Aliyev, who Haydar nominated as a presidential candidate in 2003. Ilham won
the election and continues to serve as president today, despite charges of electoral fraud and
intimidation of the media.39 Though the pragmatic approach of the Aliyevs reconciled
Azerbaijan with Russia and Iran, time appears to be on the side of the Armenians. For
nearly two decades, Nagorno-Karabakh has maintained de facto independence. Still, no
state in the international system has officially granted Nagorno-Karabakh recognition, and
when Nagorno-Karabakh issued its first constitution in 2006, it was condemned by the EU,
OSCE, and European Council.40
Azerbaijan & Caspian Energy
For another newly independent state, a similar conflict might have been utterly
crippling. But Azerbaijan is blessed with large energy deposits, both onshore and offshore
in the Caspian Sea. These energy resources have allowed Azerbaijan to make the greatest
economic progress of the three South Caucasus states. Azerbaijan‟s Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) has grown by an average of 21 percent over the past five years, and
achieved the world‟s largest GDP growth rate – 34.5 percent – in 2006. Combined, oil and
gas account for around 60 percent of Azerbaijan‟s total GDP. 41
Azerbaijan is the only major energy exporter in the South Caucasus. In 2007, it
exported 733 thousand barrels of oil per day (tb/d), which is the majority of the roughly
848 tb/d it produced that year. Azerbaijan also has great potential to expand its oil industry,
with estimated oil reserves of 7 billion barrels and current refining capacity of only 399
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tb/d. Azerbaijan‟s natural gas reserves are relatively smaller, at 30,000 billion cubic feet
(bcf). In 2006, 241 bcf of gas was produced, but this fell short of Azerbaijan‟s domestic
consumption (399 bcf).42 To meet this shortfall, Azerbaijan must import gas from both
Russia and Iran. However, with sufficient investment, Azerbaijan‟s gas production could
surpass its domestic needs in the future and allow for export of natural gas.43
Heydar Aliyev was the first president to harness the promise that energy resources
hold for Azerbaijan. At first, the energy sector faced rocky times as oil production declined
every year until 1997. Aliyev temporarily suspended negotiations with foreign companies
and granted Russia‟s LUKoil an energy partnership in order to patch up relations with
Russia.44 He then re-opened international negotiations, and forged a consortium deal with
numerous foreign energy companies that has been called the Deal of the Century.
Agreements with Western companies also led to the construction of a new pipeline, the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC). Finished in 2005, the BTC runs 1,040 miles from Baku,
through Georgian Tbilisi, to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. It bypasses the crowded Bosporus
and Dardanelles, and provides an east-west route to counter the traditional northern flow to
Russia. Since then, incredible production growth has originated in the Azeri Chirag
Guneshli oil field, and in 2006 and 2007, Azeri supplied the largest growth in oil
production outside of the Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC).45
When Azerbaijan opened up its energy sector for investment, it excited
international interest. To date, Azerbaijan has signed “over 20 major field agreements with
approximately 30 companies from 15 countries.” In 2007, the major consumers of
Azerbaijan‟s oil were Russia, Italy, Turkey, and Germany, though the US also purchased
50,000 bb/d.46 A new era of pipeline politics has commenced in the Caspian basin as a
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result, leading to an international competition for routes by which Azerbaijan‟s energy
resources may be accessed or controlled.
When the BTC pipeline was agreed on in 1999, it was without Russian participation
– Russian negotiators had left discussions in opposition to any pipeline outside of Russian
territory. Before its opening, the AIOC (Azerbaijan International Operating Company) was
shipping oil to European markets via a Russian pipeline to the Black Sea port of
Novorossiysk.47 Now the majority of Azerbaijan‟s oil exports pass through the BTC.
Smaller amounts are also exported by railway to the Georgian coast. In addition to allowing
Azerbaijan to export oil without Russia, the BTC has also opened the same opportunity for
Kazakhstan, which may deliver exports to Baku by barges crossing the Caspian Sea.
Construction of a trans-Caspian pipeline route would further expand the ability of the
Central Asian states to export without Russia.
Azerbaijan‟s choice of energy routes, however, is not the only political aspect of its
energy industry. Disputes with Turkmenistan over ownership of fields in the middle of the
Caspian have slowed Azerbaijan‟s development of these resources.48 Turkmenistan‟s
disagreements with Azerbaijan are also an obstacle to plans for any trans-Caspian pipeline.
At the heart of this dispute is the continued legal ambiguity of the Caspian Sea‟s division.
Though Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan have all agreed to classify the Caspian as a sea and
divide it according to international laws regulating seas, Turkmenistan and Iran have
favored the division of the Caspian as a lake. In this dispute, each state has taken the
position which would allow it the greatest access to Caspian energy resources.49
Azerbaijan‟s gas sector is subject to similar geopolitical considerations. Almost all
of Azerbaijan‟s electrical production facilities operate on gas, and Russia has been the
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primary supplier for Azerbaijan‟s gas imports. As with most of the its former republics,
though, Russia has been raising gas prices. At independence, Gazprom was charging
Azerbaijan around 110 dollars for every roughly 35.3 bcf. In late 2006, Gazprom raised this
to 235 dollars. Azeri leaders derided the hike as “commercial blackmail,” accusing Russia
was using its gas resources as a coercive political tool. Azerbaijan‟s initial reaction was to
sign a different gas contract with Iran. Neither side could agree on prices, however, and
Azerbaijan began to refine oil for substitution in electrical production.50 This has provided
Azerbaijan incentive to increase its natural gas production.51
Demographic Trends & the Resurgence of Islam
Years of atheism under the Soviets significantly undercut the role of Islam in
Azerbaijan. Though 90 percent of the population is officially Muslim, Islam has become
largely a cultural heritage. Shia Azeris have much more liberal attitudes toward alcohol,
pork, and women than Iranian Shia now living in Azerbaijan. While 65-70 percent of the
population is Shia and 30-35 Sunni, Svante Cornell argues that the distinction between
these two sects has actually become blurred in Azerbaijan, and many Azeris are not
knowledgeable about the differences between the two sects.52
Following by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, however, one of the most
momentous demographic transitions experienced by Azerbaijan has been the resurgence of
Islam. The resurgence of Islam may be a positive occurrence, as Azeris return to cultural
and religious roots that they were forced to abandon. It is certainly a trend that Azerbaijan
shares with the other post-Soviet republics in the Muslim world. Yet the return to Islam
may not just be a return to a cultural heritage, but also a backlash against globalization and
Westernization. As Western media and culture poured into the country after independence,
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it produced a conservative backlash in rural areas as liberalization spread unevenly,
concentrating in urban populations.53
Coupled with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, such conditions appear ripe for
radicalization. Thousands of Muslim Azerbaijani‟s were displaced and impoverished by the
Christian-Armenian military. As the Palestinian-Israeli crisis has demonstrated, povertystricken refugee camps are potentially dangerous breeding grounds for radical religious
doctrine, and both Sunni and Shia militant groups are now operating in Azerbaijan.54 Yet
so far the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has not produced any significant Islamic militancy.
This fact may speak to the degree of moderation Islam in Azerbaijan has experienced.
If militant, radical Islam has not taken deep root in Azerbaijan, however, political
Islam appears to be growing – a trend shared in neighboring Turkey. Various surveys
conducted from 2001-2005 have demonstrated that political Islam is gaining approval.55
One 2003-2005 comparative study conducted by a local firm PULS-S found that the
“Islamic model of state-building and public life is drawing more interest, and the number of
supporters of Azerbaijan‟s strengthened relations with the Islamic nations is also rising.”56
Still, thus far, Azerbaijan‟s political leadership, dominated by the semi-authoritarian
governance of Aliyev, has rejected fundamental and political Islam. In 2001, Aliyev
created a state committee for relations with religious organizations. That committee
monitors all religious activities but keeps a close eye on Saudi and Iranian missionaries.57
While Azerbaijan‟s Soviet history is a major factor in the revival of Islam, the
politicization and radicalization of Islam is primarily due to external forces. Azerbaijan is
geographically embedded in a region full of blossoming radical Islamic movements. Most
radical Islamist groups operating in Azerbaijan are trained and/or supported from abroad.
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Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region, Turkey, and the Russian Northern Caucasus
(Chechnya and Dagestan) are sources with the proximity to influence on Azeri Islam. Saudi
Arabia and Dagestan have been important sources of radical Sunni influence, but because
of Azerbaijan‟s Shiite heritage, Iranian supported Shiite movements are potentially more
threatening to Azerbaijan.58 As a result, the age old dichotomy between Azerbaijan‟s
Turkish and Iranian heritage is re-emerging. Both Turkey and Iran have sponsored religious
foundations in Azerbaijan, espousing moderate Sunni Islam and conservative Shia Islam
respectively. Further implications of this geopolitical factor will be provided in the
following discussion of Azerbaijan‟s greater geopolitical environment.
Azerbaijan & Its Geopolitical Environment
Intra-Regional Neighbors: Armenia & Georgia
Armenia
Armenia‟s participation in Nagorno-Karabakh‟s separation from Azerbaijan has
understandably created an antagonistic relationship between these two states. Because there
has been no resolution to the issue, it continues to separate these two states politically,
economically, and militarily. More recent developments in the conflict have included
Nagorno-Karabakh‟s 2006 referendum declaring its existence as a sovereign state.59 This
has only persevered Nagorno-Karabakh as a roadblock for relations, and on two separate
occasions in 2006 and 2007, brief firefights have erupted along on the border.60
For Azerbaijan, conflict with Armenia has had several foreign policy implications.
Azerbaijan‟s nationalistic turn toward Turkey was only made stronger in the face of
Russian and Iranian support for Armenia. Ties with the most Western oriented Muslim
40

state in the Middle East, facilitated Azerbaijan‟s efforts to reach out to Europe and US.
Initially, however, Armenians were a better organized political force in the US. The
Armenian lobby successfully backed a ban on US aid to Azerbaijan, creating a roadblock to
Azerbaijan‟s relationship with the US that is still a political problem today. 61 As a result of
tensions, Azerbaijan has turned to its other neighbor, Georgia, for partnership.
Georgia
Due to their divergent religious backgrounds and histories, Georgia and Azerbaijan
would appear to be mismatched partners. But the geopolitical realities of energy resources
and routes in the South Caucasus demanded pragmatism from Azerbaijan‟s leaders, not the
nationalistic idealisms of Elchibey. Troubled relationships with Armenia, Russia, and Iran
left Georgia as the best option for an energy export partner. The BTC pipeline purposefully
avoided Russia, Iran, and Armenia, and cemented an economic relationship between
Georgia and Azerbaijan. Any lethargy in Azerbaijan‟s political embrace of Georgia may be
seen primarily as stemming from a desire to maintain a pragmatic balance in its relationship
with Russia – something that Georgia has proven unable or unwilling to do. When the
Russia-Georgia War erupted in 2008, a Russian pipeline supplying gas to Georgia was
blown up. Azerbaijan responded with emergency supplies, which were ended after a
reported problem with a compressor on the pipeline.62 Otherwise, Azerbaijan has remained
rather silent on the war, a foreign policy stance that will be further discussed in relation to
Azeri-Russian relations.
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Extra-Regional Rivalry: Iran & Turkey
Iran
Soon after independence, it became clear that Azerbaijan‟s common ties with Iran
would be a double edge sword, offering the opportunity for both cooperation and
subversion. Elchibey‟s desire for the reunification of Azeri nation understandably alarmed
the Iranians and damaged Iranian-Azeri relations. But the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
distracted Azerbaijan‟s political and military attention, preventing concentration on a
second territorial conflict. By reaching out to Armenia, then, Iran perpetuated this
distraction and communicated that it could threaten Azerbaijan‟s territorial integrity too.63
Under Haydar Aliyev, Azerbaijan‟s reversal of its rhetoric on Southern Azerbaijan
opened the door for rapprochement. It was not only a pragmatic decision, but also very
likely a realistically measured one. Though Iran has suppressed the freedoms of Azeris, it
appears to be increasingly unlikely that southern Azerbaijan might ever join with northern
Azerbaijan. Not only does Iran possess the military might and will to prevent such a move,
but many Azeris in Iran have come to identify as Iranians. Pinar Ipek, a professor at Bilkent
University in Turkey, has noted that, “In fact, the Azeri minority in Iran is well integrated
into the country‟s economic life, and there are some famous religious leaders as well as
post-Iranian Revolution leaders like Ayatollah Ali Khamene„I, who are Iranian Azeris.”64
Just as Azerbaijan has ethnic ties to populations in northern Iran that it might use to
stir up trouble, Iran possesses religious ties to the conservative Shia of Azerbaijan. Iran can
use sub-state forces to great effect, as it has demonstrated with its successful manipulation
of Hamas and Hezbollah.65 Iranian supported Shia movements may be used as leverage
against secularism and Westernism in Azerbaijan or Azeri foreign policy that runs counter
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to Iranian interests. In the late 1990s, Haydar Aliyev attempted to counter Iranian religious
influence by outlawing the presence of Iranian mullahs in Azerbaijan. Then, in 2002,
Azerbaijan closed 22 different madrasas. Iran has responded by focusing its efforts on
sympathetic Azeri clergy, providing them with education and financial support. The
conservative Shia teachings of these Iranian backed teachers is a growing threat to
secularism in Azerbaijan and a survey conducted by the Baku-based Foundation for
Azerbaijan Studies found that, “Nearly 37 percent of the surveyed population in the south
of Azerbaijan favored Shari‟a governance.”66
In addition to demographic tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran, tension between
these two states in the Caspian energy sector is based on conflicting priorities in regard to
resources. While Azerbaijan has joined Russia and Kazakhstan in calling for the Caspian to
be divided as a sea, Iran has opposed this. When Aliyev framed his Deal of the Century in
1994, he pragmatically attempted to pacify Iran by offering a role in the agreement. The
problem was that the US would not cooperate in any project with Iran. As US companies
held almost a 40 percent share in the AIOC, Azerbaijan had little choice but to exclude
Tehran. Iran‟s foreign minister expressed displeasure by saying that “nullification of the
Azerbaijan-Iranian treaty concerning Iran‟s participation in the consortium contradicts
Azerbaijan‟s national interests and its previous statements. The consortium treaty may not
come into force… unless the status of the Caspian Sea is decided.”67 To which the Azeri
foreign minister retorted that “it is not legal to draw parallels between the issue of the
Caspian Sea‟s status and Azerbaijan‟s right to exploit its oil resources. Moreover, when
Iran was party to debates in the international consortium, it never raised the issue…”68
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In the summer of 2001, disputes over the division of the Caspian threatened to spill
over into military conflict. On July 23, Azeri research vessels, Geofizik-3 and Alif Hajiyev,
were exploring energy field approximately 93 miles southeast of Baku. Iranian military
aircraft flew over their position several times and then an Iranian warship approached and
demanded both ships move 8 miles north. When the Azeris replied that they had legal
rights to be there, the ship trained its guns on them. The Azeri ships retreated, and
Azerbaijan responded with diplomatic denouncements of Iranian behavior.69
It is in light of such demographic and energy resource tensions that friendly
overtures between Azerbaijan and Iran should be analyzed. While both appear to desire
deeper economic ties, shaky political and military relations have resulted in seesawing
diplomatic relations. This perspective may be extrapolated from statements made by Azeri
President Ilham Aliyev in 2004. Referring to recent dialogue between Azerbaijan and Iran,
he said that normal relations are possible if both countries would not interfere in one
another‟s internal affairs. He asserted that Azerbaijan was not intervening in Iran's
domestic affairs and insinuated that Iran should behave in the same manner saying, “We
adhere to this principle and I am happy that Iranian-Azeri relations are being created on this
basis.”70 In 2005, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki expressed the desire for
wider and more diversified relations with Azerbaijan, and discussed several concrete areas
for cooperation. One such project would be the construction of a railway to link Azerbaijan
to the Persian Gulf.71 Another was an agreement for Iran to supply natural gas to
Nakhichevan in return for Azeri gas in northern Iran.72 Because of the proximity of these
two states, they share demographic groups and histories, resources, and routes. It is
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interesting to note that the first two geopolitical factors have been subject to conflict while
the second has tended to be subject to cooperative efforts.
Turkey
While Turkey is separated by a greater geographical distance from Azerbaijan than
Iran (Armenia and Georgia separate it from all but a 6.2 mile border with Nakhichevan),
this may benefit friendly relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Today, there is no
longer a great question about Azerbaijan‟s autonomy from Turkey. To be sure, a shared
Turkic identity with people in Azerbaijan and Central Asia has offered Turkey a unique
opportunity to exert influence in the post-Soviet vacuum. Yet, dreams of pan-Turkic unity
have been largely fruitless, as the former Soviet republics have proven keen to develop
separate identities in order to defend their autonomy. Only with Azerbaijan has Turkey had
great success in forging an alliance on the foundation of a shared ethno-cultural heritage.
Realizing the potential for a close relationship with Azerbaijan, Turkey was the first
state to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan. Turkey‟s shared ethnic history with
Azerbaijan and historical tensions with Armenian made it a likely ally for Azerbaijan.
Since at least the last days of the Ottoman Empire, Turks and Armenians have shared an
antagonistic relationship. It is a conflict that even crops up in American domestic politics
from time to time, when the US Congress considers officially recognizing Ottoman
treatment of Armenians as genocide.73
Under the idealistic, nationalist leadership of Elchibey, Azerbaijan played up its
ethno-cultural ties to Turkey. This sort of rhetoric disappeared when Heydar Aliyev
became president.74 His pragmatic reconciliation with Russia and Iran entailed a temporary
cooling of the Turkish-Azeri relationship, but he never allowed it to lapse. Turkey has
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remained a steadfast supporter of Azerbaijan‟s territorial integrity, and Turkey‟s diplomatic
relationship with Armenia has been icy. Azeris have expressed the belief that Turkey is the
only states that truly understands its situation with Armenia.75
While shared ethnicity and tension with Armenia provide a basis for political
cooperation, Sunni-Shia differences have historically hampered ties between Turks and
Azeris. Azerbaijan‟s Soviet years and Turkey‟s secularist turn under Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk, however, appear to have reduced the importance of religious identity. Both
governments remain secular and generally opposed to the idea of Islamic rule. As
Azerbaijan has attempted to mitigate Islamic resurgence, moderate Turkish Sunni groups
have been allowed to operate in the country. Some experts have even speculated that the
influence of these Sunni movements may now be greater than Shia Iranian organizations.76
Azerbaijan has achieved greater energy cooperation with Turkey than Iran. Positive
American and Turkish relations have led to the US to support such cooperation and the
construction of the BTC. Another factor influencing the westward flow of Azeri oil is that
Turkey itself is an energy consumer. Turkey is an open market pulling oil towards itself,
while Iran is an oil exporter that is only interested in the profit it might make as a
middleman for Azeri oil. If Heydar Aliyev‟s election initially led to a cooling of Turkish
relations, a great foundation for a long-term Turkish-Azeri partnership was found in the
mutually beneficial BTC route.
Global Powers & the Region
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the greatest shift in the proximity of foreign
powers took place as Western states began to realize their interests in the region. These
ranged from security, to trade and energy, and the promotion of democratic development.
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After the Soviet collapse, Western countries generally continued to recognize Russia‟s
political dominance of the region and largely abstained from interfering in the developing
conflicts in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Instead, the West encouraged economic liberalization,
Western flowing energy pipelines, transportation infrastructure projects, and an “east-west
communication axis” that would wean the region off of its dependency on Russia.77 In
other words, the West focused primarily on routes and resources. Since the opening of the
Caspian Sea region Western energy companies have rushed in and secured contracts for
production of around 70 percent of the region‟s energy reserves.78
United States, NATO, & Azerbaijan
While US companies are interested in contracts in the Caspian, the US does not
need Caspian Sea energy to supply domestic demand. It does, however, have strategic,
geopolitical interests in the region‟s energy. The US has an interest in preventing the
Russian monopolization of energy resources that might allow OPEC-like manipulation of
prices, as well as a policy of economically isolating Iran from Caspian energy profits. The
US has pursued both of these goals via Azerbaijan, facilitating the BTC pipeline and
convincing Azerbaijan to limit its cooperation with Iran.
Though US interest in Azerbaijan‟s energy sector has grown steadily, USAzerbaijan relations have not always been as steady. Initially, the US backed Armenian
independence in Nagorno-Karabakh. Large numbers of Armenians immigrated to the US
during and after WWI, and this population now constitutes a strong political lobby within
the US. Senator John Kerry, motivated by the Armenian lobby in his state of
Massachusetts, backed the sanctioning of Azerbaijan under Section 907 of the Freedom
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Support Act passed by the US Congress in 1992. At the time, Azerbaijan did not even have
diplomatic representation in the US.79
Subsequently, the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton all urged
the repeal of Section 907, but neither administration was able to convince the US Congress
to act. 80 Section 907 continued to hamper US-Azeri relations until January 2002, when
George W. Bush managed to secure a temporary suspension of the ban on US aid. In the
previous year, US-Azeri relations had come to a critical turning point. Following the
September 11th attacks, Azerbaijan became a new partner in the War on Terror. Over flight
permission was sought by the US, to support its mission in Afghanistan.81 Azerbaijan
approved US over flight, and in return, the Bush administration suspended the aid ban.
Such Azeri cooperation might not have been as forthcoming from if it had not been
for two other factors, however. Russia‟s initial cooperation with US operations created a
permissive environment for US-Azeri security cooperation that might have otherwise been
considered a security threat due to the new proximity of US troops. Furthermore,
Azerbaijan may have perceived this as a timely opportunity to find an ally in the face of
Iranian threats, as it was earlier in 2001 that Iran had intimidated the Azeri ships.
Post-9/11 cooperation established a great deal of momentum in US-Azeri relations.
While anti-Americanism was rising around the world following US action in Iraq, a 2006
survey revealed that a majority of Azeris still viewed the US positively. Azerbaijan even
sent troops to Iraq, the only other state with a Muslim majority population to send troops
besides Kazakhstan. All this is not to say that US-Azeri relations are stellar, however, or
uncompromisingly established. The temporary waiver of US sanctions, far from patching
differences with Azerbaijan, has been perceived by some to be a method of blackmailing
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the Azeri government every time the waiver is up for renewal. It is difficult for Azeris to
understand why the US government will not completely repeal this ban and continues to
send aid directly to Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition, Ilham Aliyev has also not forgotten
that Azerbaijan‟s foreign policy must take Russian into account, and as the Russia-Georgia
War have produced new US-Russia tensions, Azerbaijan must tread carefully.82
Azeri participation in North Atlantic Treaty Organization‟s (NATO) Partnership for
Peace (PfP) is an example of security cooperation with the West that Russia distrusts.83
Though the PfP program does not make Azerbaijan a NATO member, it has facilitated
“military cooperation, defense modernization, democratic control of the armed forces,
political consultations on security issues, peace support operations, security sector reform,
civil emergency planning, security related scientific, economic and environmental
cooperation.”84 NATO, though not a sovereign state, is an actor that any contemporary
geopolitical approach to International Relations must take into account. It is because of
NATO that one may speak of a semi-cohesive Western security orientation.
The EU, OSCE, & Azerbaijan
In Azerbaijan‟s relationships with the European states, international and regional
organizations have played a critical role. As NATO has been important for brining the US
and Europe together in security cooperation with Azerbaijan, the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has also been instrumental in Europe‟s security
relationship with Azerbaijan. The OSCE has served as the primary forum for negotiations
between Armenian and Azerbaijan.85 As such, the OSCE provided the opportunity for
some of the first coordination with the European states.
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The EU itself did not emerge until 1993, and it was not until 1999 that EUAzerbaijan relations began to deepen seriously, when the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement (PCA) was adopted, establishing a legal framework for EU-Azerbaijan
relations. This step was the first toward greater cooperation in politics, economics, and
institutional reform. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was the next step in
Azerbaijan‟s relations with the EU, and a major step towards a EU foreign policy.86 In June
of 2004, the European Council decided to offer membership in the ENP to all three of the
South Caucasus states.87 The ENP is a preparatory step for EU membership, and sets goals
for political, economic, and institutional reforms. It is also tied the EU‟s policy of
minimizing the proximity of unstable states, however. “The European Security Strategy,
adopted in December 2003, emphasizes the need for the EU to seek to build a belt of wellgoverned countries on its periphery.”88
Simultaneously, an important energy relationship is developing between Europe
and Azerbaijan. Major energy projects worth billions of dollars have also contributed to the
growing economic integration of Azerbaijan with the Westward oriented states of Turkey
and Georgia. These projects include the Deal of the Century, the BTC, the Baku-TbilisiErzurum (BTE) gas pipeline, and the Baku-Achalkalaki-Kars (BAK) railway. Unlike
Russia and Iran, are primarily interested in Azerbaijan‟s energy resources in order to
maximize their control of Caspian energy for wealth and power, the EU states have a longterm interest in establishing a consumer relationship with Azerbaijan. This is a strategic
objective for the EU, and in December of 2006, the EU and Azerbaijan signed an
agreement for such strategic energy cooperation.89

50

The EU states are net energy importers, producing 2,394 tb/d of oil and 18.6 bcf/y
of gas in 2007 while consuming 14,861 tb/d of oil and 47 bcf/y of gas.90 Before even the
end of the Cold War, Europe had become dependent upon Russia energy to satisfy
domestic consumption. Now, as former Soviet republics are becoming EU members, that
dependency is growing. By 2006, 33 percent of the EU‟s oil imports and 40 percent of its
gas imports were supplied by Russia.91 While the BTC has opened the door for additional
diversification of oil imports, energy partnership with Azerbaijan is the first step in making
greater European diversification efforts possible. Of these possibilities, the Nabucco
pipeline has emerged as the EU‟s greatest plan for continued energy diversification.
Though there still a great many obstacles to be overcome, Nabucco plans call for a gas
pipeline that would transit the Caspian seabed from Turkmenistan to Baku, where it would
link up with the existing BTE route and provide gas to Turkey and Europe.92
Russia, the CIS, & Azerbaijan
As should be quite clear, Russia is more than a foreign global power in the South
Caucasus. It maintains the greatest geographic proximity of all the global powers and
remains integrally tied to the politics, security, and economy of the region. It controls
energy import and export routes, maintains military bases, and mediates territorial disputes.
Moreover, significant populations of Russian citizens continue to reside in these former
Soviet republics. In Azerbaijan, Russians account for 1.8 percent of the population, or
roughly 148,000 people. Throughout history, the presence of one nation‟s people in another
state‟s territory has been used to justify military and political interventions, and Russia has
used the argument that it was protecting Russian citizens when it countered Georgian
troops in South Ossetia during 2008.93 Vladimir Putin, the man who may be credited with
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Russia‟s resurgence in the 21st century, has referred to Russian citizens scatter abroad by
the Soviet Union‟s collapse as a great disaster.
“…after the Soviet Union‟s disintegration, 25 million Russian people found
themselves outside Russian territory. Twenty-five million! They had lived
by tradition in other Soviet republics, had moved there some time in the
past, or left Russia to work there after receiving a higher education. Isn‟t
this a tragedy?”94
When the Soviet Union fell apart, Russia did not intend to allow its former
republics to operate completely independent of Russian interests. On December 8, 1991,
Russia created the Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS), in an attempt to maintain
a special relationship with these states. Azerbaijan joined the CIS on December 21, but
terminated its membership under President Elchibey.95 In those first years after the Union,
Russia was consumed with its own problems as its economy crashed to half its previous
size, but the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict soon provided Russia with leverage to counter
Azerbaijan‟s nationalism. 96 Between 1992 and 1994, Russia unofficially supplied roughly
a billion dollars in arms and ammunition to Armenia without charge.97 Armenian victories
ultimately drove Elchibey from office. Getting rid of Elchibey was only the first step
bringing Azerbaijan in line, however, and only once Heydar Aliyev renewed Azerbaijan‟s
membership in the CIS did Russia intervene to stop the advance of Armenian forces.
Membership in the CIS is important to Russia because it still considers the
Caucasus to be its security sphere, an essential buffer between it and the Middle East.
Though Russia no longer maintains any military bases in Azerbaijan (unlike Georgia and
Armenia), it does still maintain a lease on Azerbaijan‟s Gabala radar station.98 While
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Russia was initially cooperative with US-led Western intrusion in its former republics
following 9/11, its view of the West‟s new military proximity has grown steadily more
negative. In particular, NATO‟s enlargement is perceived as a threat to Russian security.99
Through the CIS, Russia is attempting to create a security alternative to NATO, the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Created in 2002, the CSTO has held
military exercises in Armenia.100 Azerbaijan has not yet joined this organization. The CIS,
which is supposed to defend the national sovereignty of its member states, has come to be
perceived by as a mechanism manipulated by Russia. As Putin strengthened Russia, some
members of the CIS began to discuss the possible necessity of a “dignified divorce.”101 In
2006, a CIS anniversary meeting was even canceled by Russia and Kazakhstan “without
consulting the other members,” and was perhaps indicative of the Kremlin‟s “inability to
garner support from other members for a plan to revamp the organization.”102
Beyond security concerns, Russia also has strategic economic interests vis-à-vis
Azerbaijan. Russia has historically been Azerbaijan‟s only energy export route and energy
resource production partner. As western companies snatched up production contracts in the
Caspian and supported East-West export routes, Russia has lost potential energy revenues
and political leverage. Today, Russia stands to lose additional ground if it allows routes like
Nabucco be completed. Russia‟s economic recovery has been primarily based on growth in
the Russian energy sector. As world energy prices rose, Russian energy firms began to
record profits. In 2003, LUKoil (a major oil exporting firm) reported that its revenues had
risen by an amazing 38 percent. This explosive growth drove the Russian economy,
boosting the Central Back‟s currency levels by $4.8 billion (10 percent).103 The economic
turnaround made also made President Putin immensely popular in Russia, facilitating to his
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centralization of the Russian state and his vision of restoring Russia to a global power.104
Energy resources and routes, then, have become essential for Russian national prosperity,
the political popularity of its leaders, and international political power.
Due to the proximity of Russia, Azerbaijan‟s foreign policy must take into account
the growing strength of Russia, Russian interest in its resources and routes, and its own
limited ability to mitigate Russian influence through regional and international
organizations. Azerbaijan, along with Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova attempted to create a
separate organization for the pursuit of mutual political and economic cooperation in 1997.
This organization is named GUAM (taking the first letter from each member country), and
became GUUAM in 1999, when Uzbekistan joined. The organization has accomplished
little since its inception. In 2004, only two member states attended a GUUAM meeting held
in Yalta, and in 2005, Uzbekistan withdrew its membership. One of the boldest steps the
organization has taken came in 2006, with an initiative to expand cooperation for the
creation of a mutual security force that could replace Russian troops in separatist regions in
Georgia. Such cooperation, however, has failed to materialize.105
Even now, with Putin officially removed from the presidency, Russia‟s war with
Georgia has demonstrated that the international community will do little to stand in the way
of Russia‟s pursuit of its interests in the Caucasus. During that war Azerbaijan appeared to
remain relatively neutral, some government officials even “voiced pro-Moscow
statements.” But in February of 2009, new reports of Russian weapon supplies to Armenia
demonstrated that Azerbaijan and Russia have not completely reconciled their differences
in Nagorno-Karabakh. It remains to be seen how Ilham Aliyev will respond, but he will
likely continue to maintain a balanced, pragmatic position.106
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Conclusion
In the case of Azerbaijan, the relevance of geopolitical analysis may clearly be
seen. A return to Azerbaijan‟s pre-Soviet and Soviet history allows an understanding of
cultural, religious, and ethnic variables that have laid a foundation for Azerbaijan‟s
contemporary politics, economics, and security. As the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
illustrates, ethno-political struggles continue to define international politics. That territorial
struggle has not only influenced Azerbaijan‟s relationship with Armenia, but has also
contributed to Armenia‟s alignment with Russia and Iran and Azerbaijan‟s political
distance from both of those states.
The interplay between domestic geopolitical factors and external geopolitical actors
may also be seen in Azerbaijan‟s religious demography. The recession of Islam‟s influence
in Azerbaijan is a historical trend that owes to Azerbaijan‟s central geography and, in
particular, years of Soviet control. The waning of the Shia faith opened the opportunity for
Azerbaijan and Turkey to establish an alliance based upon shared ethnicity that had been
hither to unrealized. At the same time, Islam‟s resurgence in Azerbaijan threatens to disrupt
this Westward orientation and, perhaps, pull Azerbaijan back toward Iran. Recognizing
this, both Turkey and Iran have acted to influence the religious thinking of Azeris. This is a
continuation of the historical Turko-Persian tensions that characterized pre-Soviet
Azerbaijan, and the proximity of these two regional powers to Azerbaijan‟s ethnic and
religious demography continues to constrain its foreign policy orientation.
Perhaps the most important geopolitical characteristic of Azerbaijan, however, is its
energy resources, which have invited international competition for export routes. This has
geopolitical and geo-economic implications. The northward orientation of Azerbaijan‟s
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Soviet pipeline routes is indicative of the history of economic dependency bred by Russian
empire. In order to break this dependency, politics and geography allow Azerbaijan few
choices. Since Armenia and Iran were not viable options for additional export pipelines,
Azerbaijan turned to Georgia. The result of energy competition in the Caspian basin has
only served to reinforce Azerbaijan‟s westward orientation in alliances, as Iran has
militarily blustered toward Azerbaijan and Russia has demonstrated that it will manipulate
energy dependence for political gain.
The external geopolitical environment of Azerbaijan has also constrained
Azerbaijan‟s foreign policy explicitly. Because of US isolation of Iran, Azerbaijan has
chosen to pursue a less cooperative relationship with Iran than it might have otherwise, in
order to realize greater political and economic gains from US backing. Analysis of
Azerbaijan‟s geopolitical position makes this choice appear quite rational. However, it
would be hasty and overly deterministic to argue that Azerbaijan‟s geopolitical position in
the South Caucasus has decided the course of its foreign policy orientation. Decision
makers may come to different conclusions within the same geopolitical context.
This is starkly evident in the contrast between the presidencies of Elchibey and
Heydar Aliyev. Elchibey‟s idealistic nationalism may be criticized for producing an
irrational policy approach, given the realities of Azerbaijan‟s geopolitical position. Yet, in
the same geopolitical context both men made very different decisions. Thus the limits of
geopolitical variables in foreign policy are demonstrated while the contrast between the
presidencies of these two men still reveals the constraining effects of geopolitical
circumstances. For example, by defying Russia and Iran with his foreign policy, Elchibey
exacerbated Azerbaijan‟s geopolitical isolation. Only when Heydar Aliyev demonstrated
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deference toward Russia did the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict come to an end. Thus,
Azerbaijan‟s demography, routes, and resources all are interwoven to create a geopolitical
environment that the leaders of small states may not always be able to escape.
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CHAPTER 3: ARMENIA
Of the three Caucasus states, Armenia occupies the most geographically
challenging location. (See Appendix E for a topographic map of Armenia.) It is landlocked
in the heart of the South Caucasus, without access to even the Caspian Sea. To its east,
Armenia shares a disputed border with Azerbaijan, and to the west, it shares a border with
Azerbaijan‟s close ally, Turkey. The only other two states to border Armenia are Iran in the
south and Georgia in the north. The scholar Anahide Ter Minassian has argued that
Armenia‟s geography has been the single greatest determinant of its troubled history.1 It
has historically occupied a central and isolated geographic position – albeit as a larger
territorial entity. Today, Armenia officially is the smallest state of the South Caucasus,
occupying 29,743 square kilometers, though conflict with Azerbaijan has provided
Armenians the opportunity to expand their territorial control.
Geopolitical History of Armenia in the Caucasus
Pre-Soviet Armenia
The Armenians have a long history in the Caucasus. These people emerged from a
mix of indigenous Hurro-Urartean tribes and migrating Indo-Europeans. They established
themselves in the rugged geographic space that spans Asia Minor and the Caucasus, where
the rough terrain inhibited the emergence of a “strong central political power throughout
much of Armenian history.” 2
The first united Armenian dynasty was under the Yervandunis, who were appointed
as regional governors by the Medes (6th century BC) and Persians (550-331 BC). This
dynasty ruled Armenia with relative autonomy even after Alexander the Great defeated the
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Persian Empire in 331 BC.3 That autonomy allowed the Armenians to develop into a
distinctive people group, though they were heavily influenced by Persian culture and
Zoastrianism.4
As Rome expanded into Asia Minor and the Parthians established themselves in
Persia, Armenia became a buffer between these two empires. The political autonomy of
Armenia, then governed by the Artashesian dynasty, depended on the balance of power
between the Romans and Parthians. The Armenians allied themselves first with Persia, and
then with Rome, in order to maintain their independence.5 Eventually, the Armenians came
to permanently embrace a Westward orientation with their conversion to Christianity in
314-315.6 From that point on, the Armenians would remain distinct from the Muslim
Arabs, Turks, and Persians that came to dominate the greater Middle East. Turkic invasions
and the fall of the Byzantine Empire, however, ultimately cut Armenia off from the
Christian West, ushering in what Armenians refer to as the „dark centuries.‟7 Mongol
invasions and the marauding of Tamerlane in 1380 and 1390 destroyed Armenian lands
and decimated Armenian society.8 This pressure led to the first dispersions of Armenians,
driving merchants and nobles to flee to Europe.9
When a new set of Armenian elite began to emerge, they were mostly affiliated
with the Christian Georgian kingdom that attained its height of power in the 12th and 13th
Centuries. As a result, Tbilisi (the capital of Georgia) became a major center for
Armenians.10 The lands of the Armenians were torn between empires once again in the 16th
century as Ottoman Turks and Safavid Persians struggled for power. Caught between these
Muslim empires, Armenians turned to Christian Europe and Russia as external powers
which might be used to counterbalance Islamic might.11
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When the Russian empire began to press into the South Caucasus, such an alliance
became more realistic. The Treaty of Turkmenchay granted Russia control of eastern
portions of Armenian lands, and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1888 brought Armenian
populations in Kars and Ardahan into the empire. Yet many Armenians remained to the
West, within the Ottoman Empire. Armenia had become a regional fault line once more.12
Though Russia would not tolerate Armenian independence, it was perceived as the
protector of the Armenian people, liberating them from the Muslims. This history,
Panossian argues, engrained a reliance on foreign powers in the Armenian psyche.13
The relationship between Armenians and Russians excited ethnic and religious
tensions with Azeris. Between 1828 and 1830, approximately 130,000 Armenians were
encouraged by Russia to immigrate into the South Caucasus, at least 18,000 of whom
settled in the Karabakh province.14 This historical demographic dislocation laid foundation
for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
While there were tensions between Armenia and Russia due to attempts to
„Russify‟ the Armenian population, the greater enemy was always the Muslims Turks.15
Armenians under the Ottoman Turks faced oppression and sporadic violence. Their hope
for independence resulted in Armenian revolts during the late 19th century. From the
Ottoman perspective, the Armenians were a threat to their unstable border with Russia. On
the decline and defensive, the Ottomans realized that the Armenians afforded Russia and
Europe a constant political excuse for interventions/invasions in Ottoman territory. As a
result, Ottoman oppression of Armenians escalated and peaked during WWI. While Russia
and the Ottoman Empire warred, Armenians were forcibly relocated from their traditional
homes or attacked and massacred in what has been referred to as the Armenian Genocide
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of 1915. Though there is much vehement debate over whether or not this constitutes a
genocide, and what blame the modern state of Turkey bears, it is estimated that as many as
1.5 million Armenians were killed in 1915 (one third to one half of the total Armenian
population).16
Armenian populations beyond Russia‟s borders were decimated, and the Bolshevik
revolution led to the retreat of Russian forces, which left eastern Armenia open to Ottoman
troops. Furthermore, when the TDFR fell apart, both Azerbaijan and Georgia claimed
control of territories with large Armenian populations. Georgia and Armenia fought briefly
over the border regions of Lori and Akhalkalak, but fighting between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over the territories of Nakhichevan, Zangenur, and Karabakh was the most
intense.17 Armenian forces in Zangenur destroyed nearly 115 Azeri settlements, killed
7,000 Azeris, and displaced 50,000 others.18 Fighting in Nakhichevan and Karabakh was
not as decisive and would not be resolved until the end of the Soviet Union.
Soviet Armenia
The allied defeat of the Ottoman Turks at the end of WWI promised an opportunity
for Armenians to reclaim lands they had historically inhabited, but Mustafa Kemal Atatürk
and Turkish national forces were quick to consolidate the new Turkish state. Trapped
between advancing Turkish and Bolshevik Russian troops, Armenian independence could
not be preserved. Russia was the better of two evils, and Armenia submitted to the Soviet
Union. Soviet mediation of the territorial disputes between Armenia and its neighbors
meant that even though Nagorno-Karabakh possessed a predominantly Armenian
population, the Soviets included it within Azerbaijan because of its geographical separation
from the Armenian republic by a line of mountains.
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This decision left most Armenians unhappy and Karabakh-Armenians worried
about their future in a Muslim-Turkic Azeri state. Soviet decision makers ignored
Armenian pleas for the unification of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, a desire for
territorial integrity that was made more acute by a historical sense of territorial loss. By
some estimates, Armenian territory was once six times larger than the territory that the
Soviets granted to the Armenian republic.19 Indeed, Armenia became the smallest of all the
Soviet Republics.20 When the Soviets made Nagorno-Karabakh an autonomous region
within Azerbaijan, its borders were defined without any physical connection to the
Armenian republic, placing the Armenian population in a precarious position when the
Soviet Union began to collapse. At the same time, the Soviet system encouraged the
strengthening of Armenian nationalism and did little to resolve the historical animosity
between Armenians and the Turkic Azeris. The Soviets relocated Azeris from Armenia,
strengthening the dominance of Armenians in what was already the most ethnically
homogenous of all the Soviet Republics.21
In the years following Khrushchev, public debate over the status of NagornoKarabakh began to boil openly. Armenian protestors took to the streets of Yerevan on April
24, 1965, to mark the “50th anniversary of the deportations of the Armenians by the
Ottomans” and to demand the “re-establishment” of Armenian control over NagornoKarabakh.22 Armenian demands for recognition were largely ignored by the Communist
Party and discontent was left to simmer. So when Gorbachev announced reforms,
promoting glasnost and perestroika, this discontent burst forth anew. In 1988, the
Armenian majority in Nagorno-Karabakh made two different bids to separate from
Azerbaijan, submitting an application for incorporation with Armenia and voting to
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withdraw from Azerbaijan. Moscow rejected these actions and, instead, responded by
taking steps to pacify the region, providing economic aid, firing several high ranking
officials, and deploying Soviet troops in the area.23
Armenian attempts to secure autonomy in Nagorno-Karabakh excited violence, and
anti-Armenian pograms rocked Azerbaijan.24 Though both sides perpetrated violence
against each other, Azeri violence further served to entrench the Armenian belief that
Azeris were Turks, and that Turks were the enemies of the Armenian people. Azeris and
Armenians fled from their homes in the hundreds of thousands as ethnic fighting
mounted.25 After the Moscow putsch in August of 1991, Soviet military support for
Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh terminated and Karabakh-Armenian found their
opportunity for freedom had arrived. Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence and
prepared to confront Azerbaijan.26
Armenia & Independence
On August 23, 1990, Armenia declared its independence, and in October of that
year, Levon Ter-Petrosian was elected the first Armenian president. Ter-Petrosian is a little
more difficult to classify as a pragmatic semi-authoritarian, because at the time of his
election, he was a nationalist that was elected to a hyper-presidential system. However, as
time would reveal, his presidency came to be characterized by a Soviet-esqe
authoritarianism and a pragmatic approach to Azerbaijan that was quite moderate when
measured against the current of Armenian nationalism.27 To start, however, Armenia‟s
election proved unifying. Armenian attention immediately turned to the issue of NagornoKarabakh, and soon the Armenian state was unofficially backing the Karabakhis in their
war for independence from Azerbaijan.
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Nagorno-Karabakh
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan received international recognition of their
independence in 1992, and the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh quickly began to turn into an
inter-state war. Yet, Armenia originally attempted to conceal its role in Nagorno-Karabakh
under Ter-Petrosian‟s cautious leadership. Armenia had agreed to accept its Soviet borders
in January of 1992, and since Nagorno-Karabakh had been internationally recognized as a
part of Azeri territory, Armenia was open to international criticism if it had officially tried
to claim Nagorno-Karabakh. Instead, the government of Ter-Petrosian decided to recognize
Nagorno-Karabakh‟s 1991 declaration of independence, in order to portray the conflict as a
civil war rather than an inter-state war.28
The reality, however, was that Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia were inextricably
linked. Ter-Petrosian had been involved in the Armenian Karabakh movement himself, an
issue that was central for all Armenians.29 Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh constituted
roughly three fourths of the region‟s population, and thus had a numerical advantage over
Azeris who lived there.30 Yet, the conflict was far from determined because Azerbaijan had
inherited a strong military force from the Soviet Union.31 For their part, the Karabakhis
were joined in their struggle by troops from Armenia and former Soviet military units.32
The importance of Armenia for Karabakhis was underscored by the fact that the
first major objective of their forces was to open a transportation route to Armenia. Once the
towns of Shusha and Lachin were captured, Nagorno-Karabakh had a supply route to
support its war effort. Having secured this objective, Armenian forces took the offensive
and “between July and October further regions such as Aghdara (July 7, 1993), Aghdam
(July 23, 1993), Jabrayil (August 23, 1993), Fizuli (August 23, 1993), Gubadley (August
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31, 1993), and Zangilan (October 23, 1993) were occupied by Armenia.”33 Karabakhi
forces took full advantage of Azerbaijan domestic chaos and carved out a defensive buffer
around Nagorno-Karabakh, occupying 20 percent of Azerbaijan.34
By 1993, evidence that Armenian troops were fighting alongside the Karabakhis
was undeniable, and military expansion beyond Nagorno-Karabakh‟s borders met with
international condemnation.35 International opinion began to turn against Armenia, and
after Azerbaijan‟s president, Heydar Aliyev, reconciled with Russia, Russian pressure led
the Armenians to halt their advance. In May 1994, the Russian-backed Bishkek Protocol
brought an end to hostilities. By that time, Armenian forces had secured most of their
strategic objectives, physically uniting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia and establishing a
defensive buffer.
While Azerbaijan will not recognize the independence of the region, Armenia
maintains effective control. Time appears to be on the side of the Armenians as NagornoKarabakh has maintained de facto independence for nearly two decades. Yet, no state in the
international system has officially granted Nagorno-Karabakh recognition. When NagornoKarabakh issued its first constitution in 2006, it was condemned by the EU, OSCE, and
European Council (EC).36 Still, the possibility that the Armenians might surrender ground
on this position is unlikely, as any leader proposing negotiations runs the risk of being
perceived as a traitor.
This is one of the factors that contributed to the eventual ousting of Ter-Petrosian.
Not only did his willingness to compromise run against the current of national feeling in
Armenia, but his slide into authoritarianism undermined his legitimacy. His attempt to
manipulate the presidential election results in 1996 created a crisis which forced his
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resignation. As a result, Robert Kocharian, Ter-Petrosian‟s nationalist prime minister found
political opportunity to gain the presidency.37
Armenia & Economic Isolation
While the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a military success, it had severe
economic ramifications for Armenia. Azerbaijan and Turkey both closed their borders with
Armenia, suspending trade. During the Soviet era, 85 percent of Armenia‟s rail traffic had
originated in Azerbaijan.38 Such isolation compounded the economic crash that followed
the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the size of the Armenian economy declined by 60
percent between 1991 and 1993.39
In order to foster international trade, Armenia had to turn to routes left with Georgia
in the north and Iran in the south, but there is only a single road connecting Armenia to
Iran. Therefore, routes with Georgia became critical for Armenia‟s economy, particularly
because those routes also connected Armenia to Russia. Despite the fact that rail lines and
roadways with Georgia have consistently remained in poor condition, these routes now
carry around 70 percent of all Armenia‟s international trade.40
The Azeri trade embargo also severed pipelines that supplied Armenia‟s access to
natural gas, creating a national heating crisis. For energy, Armenia become reliant on its
hydropower generators and fuel trucked in through Georgia. An alternative gas route with
Georgia was established in 1993, but that route proved quite vulnerable to Azeri saboteurs
and interruptions induced by Georgia‟s own domestic turbulence as it contended with
separatism in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Even after fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh
ground to a halt, the energy sector remained in dire straits, and in 1998, a major earthquake
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shut down Armenia‟s only nuclear plant, which had been supplying one third of Armenia‟s
electricity.41
While Azerbaijan‟s energy wealth allowed its economy to rebound, the Armenian
economy struggled without the hydrocarbon resources necessary to keep it running.
Armenia attempted to reform its energy sector through privatization, which opened the
door for Russian companies. In 2002, ownership of the Hrazdan thermal power plant, the
Sevan-Hrazdan hydropower cascade, and financial control of the Madzamor nuclear plant
were transferred to Russian companies in return for 96 million dollars of debt
forgiveness.42 In 2002, a Russian-Armenia Treaty was concluded, exchanging Armenian
debt for Russian holdings in Armenian equity. And then in 2006, Russia gained additional
control of Armenian assets in return for not increasing Armenia‟s gas prices.43 Due to the
routes available, Armenia has had little choice but to pursue a greater energy relationship
with Russia, though some energy may be obtained via Iran. Of the 48 tb/d of oil and 72 bcf
of gas that Armenia consumed in 2008, 100 percent had to be imported.44
Armenia‟s privatizing reforms, while surrendering significant economic influence
to Russian companies resulted in the stabilization of its energy sector, which contributed to
its economic revival. Additionally, Armenia received “high levels of remittances and
private transfers from diaspora Armenians,” which provided funds for the rebuilding of the
economy.45 Between 1994 and 2000, average GDP growth was 5 percent. That growth has
accelerated to around 11 percent since 2001.46 Both Kocharian and his presidential
successor, Serzh Sarksyan (Kocharian‟s former prime minister), have found this economic
success a vital component to their electoral success.47
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Despite Armenia‟s recent economic success, geopolitical realities continue to
constrain this growth. In order to succeed, Armenia has had to embrace significant Russian
dominance in its economy. The Armenian economy has also become dependent on
international aid and remittances for its large diaspora.48 These sources of funding are spent
by the central Armenian government, which has proven reluctant to surrender its economic
control, causing it to prefer foreign aid to privately directed foreign investment.49
Demographic Turmoil & the Armenian Diaspora
War and economically dark times have produced a great deal of poverty in Armenia
and have prompted more than 25 percent of Armenia‟s population to emigrate since 1991.50
This has created a dangerous drain on the young and skilled population, complicating
Armenia‟s economic difficulties. Yet this trend is a part of a historical pattern of dispersion,
and the Armenian Diaspora has become a vital factor in Armenia‟s history.
Armenia‟s difficult history has compelled successive waves of Armenians to flee
from their homeland. As a result, the Armenian people have become scattered
internationally. Today that population is of significant strength and size. While the total
population of modern Armenia is between 3.5 and 4 million, almost twice that number (7 to
8 million) reside abroad.51 Around 1 million Armenians now live in the United States,
roughly 1.5 million in Russia, and at least another million in Europe, the Middle East, and
Latin America.52 These populations have become representatives for Armenia abroad and
have gained influence in the foreign policies of their new home states, particularly
democratic states like the US.53
For centuries, Armenians have pled for the attention of Europe and Russia, seeking
external support for the constantly overrun Armenian nation. The existence of the
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Armenian Diaspora may be traced back to the 14th century, although some claim that the
Diaspora may be traced even further back.54 The Armenian Diaspora, however, became
most consequential after Ottoman violence during WWI. This prompted a massive exodus
of Armenian people from their traditional homes.
Yossi Shain defines diasporas as, “a people with common national origin who
reside outside a claimed or an independent home territory. They regard themselves or are
regarded by others as members or potential members of their country of origin (claimed or
already existing) a status held regardless of their geographical location and citizen status
outside their home country.”55 As such, diasporas are often very committed to preserving or
restoring their „nation.‟56 In particular, conflict-generated diasporas like that of the
Armenians are most likely to maintain attachment to their historic homeland or nation.57
The violent events of 1915 have proven to be the most galvanizing events in
Armenian consciousness. Today, the main political focus of the Armenian Diaspora is
seeking international recognition of Ottoman brutality as a genocidal event. Armenian
diaspora groups have supported Karabakhi independence and Armenian democracy, and
backed foreign aid to both Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.58 Diasporas are also an
important source of remittances, which are often used to support conflicts.59 The
Diaspora‟s financial support for Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh, and its general
unwillingness to compromise with Turkey and Armenia, have been identified as important
factors in preserving Armenia‟s conflicts with its neighbors.60 Funds from the Diaspora
were utilized in the construction of highway infrastructure to connect Armenia and
Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as to facilitate rebuilding in the Karabakh.61
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Still, while the Armenian Diaspora has been important for the Armenian state, the
two are actually not always unified. The Soviet Iron Curtain separated Armenians from the
Western Diaspora for 70 years, producing differences between Western and Eastern
Armenians as each developed independently.62 While the Western Diaspora may favor
Armenia over Western allies like Turkey and Azerbaijan, these Armenians generally
support the establishment of democracy in Armenia and view dependency on Russia
negatively.63
Armenia & Its Geopolitical Environment
Intra-Regional Neighbors: Azerbaijan & Georgia
Azerbaijan
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the central issue separating Azerbaijan and
Armenia. In their diplomatic struggle for international attention, Armenia‟s Diaspora has
proven to be a formidable political force. Indeed, Azeri officials cite the Armenian lobby in
the US as the primary obstacle to peace in the South Caucasus and to the development of
US-Azeri ties.64 The Diaspora certainly succeeded in erecting a significant roadblock to
Azeri-US relations when it backed the Section 907 ban on US aid to Azerbaijan in the
Freedom Support Act. In addition to successfully limiting Azerbaijan‟s aid, the Freedom
Support Act made Armenia the highest per capita aid recipient of US aid in the former
Soviet Union.65
Armenia‟s initial success in winning the international support made Azerbaijan‟s
alliance with Turkey all the more essential. This, in turn, cemented Armenian perceptions
of the Azeris as their historic Turkish enemies, despite the fact that Azeri Turks have long
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been differentiated by their Shia faith and Persian ties. More recently, the West has
assumed a more neutral stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, refusing to recognize the
region as independent until both sides can agree on a settlement. From the Western
perspective, resolution of the conflict could serve not only the goal of peace, but it might
also free Armenia from its current orientation toward Russia and Iran.
There has been some recent progress made toward an agreement. For example, the
current presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan, met in
June of 2008 during a CIS summit.66 Meeting and rumors of progress in negotiations has
continued into 2009, but little visible, substantive progress has been made thus far.67
Georgia
At first blush, Armenia and Georgia appear to share some very basic
commonalities. Both possess an ancient Christian heritage, and both historically chose,
when push came to shove, to side with Christian Russia in the face of Muslim forces.
However, nationalism has produced territorial conflict between both states. Furthermore,
both have taken different stands in relation to Russia since independence. This is what
creates the most tension in Georgia-Armenian relations.
Despite these differences, Armenia has pursed friendly relations with Georgia. This
is because Georgia is critical to Armenia‟s economic survival. Without use of Georgian
territory, Armenia is separated from Russia, Europe, and the Black Sea. It is hemmed in by
Turkey and Azerbaijan, with only Iran as an outlet in the south. As the majority of
Armenia‟s international trade passes through Georgia, positive relations are a necessity.
Thus, while Armenia has aggressively pursued independence for Nagorno-Karabakh, it has
attempted to downplay tensions over Georgian territory in which major Armenian groups
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reside. Instead of seeking the annexation of Georgia‟s Javakheti region, Armenia has
actually attempted to silence calls for unification in order to secure its economic
relationship with Georgia.68 In an attempt to mitigate conflicts, Armenia has pursued the
diplomatic talks to delaminate their shared border.69
In the pursuit of an economic relationship, Armenia also offers routes that interest
Georgia. The Armenian-Iran pipeline that was completed in 2007 offers Georgia the
possibility to mitigate its energy dependency on Russia. That is a possibility Iran also
favors, as a pipeline to Georgia offers to opportunity to connect Iran to Europe.70 Both
states benefit from transportation routes which increase trade for their economies.71 In
2004, Saakashvili expressed that, “…Armenia can be of help to us, insofar as she maintains
close ties of friendship with Russia.”72 There may be some hope in this regard, as Armenia
has maintained a very balanced approach to Georgia in the midst of the recent RussiaGeorgia War. Russian transportation blockades of Georgia threatened to cut Armenia‟s
trade with Russia as well. Therefore, Armenia has a stake in the resolution of that
conflict.73
Extra-Regional Rivalry: Iran & Turkey
Iran
Historically, the Muslim Persians were Armenia‟s southern enemy. Today,
however, that has changed. Relations between Iran and Armenia have become very
friendly. Armenia has had economic motivations to seek this relationship, while Iran has
had both economic and security motivations to welcome Armenia. As noted in the chapter
on Azerbaijan, backing Armenia has allowed Iran political leverage in its attempts to quash
discussions of Azerbaijan‟s unification with Azeris in northern Iran.
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In 2000, there were discussions of a three-way union between Armenia,
Turkmenistan and Iran. The Armenian presidential spokesman Vage Gabrielian said that
“We are very interested in creating an economic union with Turkmenistan and Iran.”74
Friendly diplomatic and economic relations have also trickled into security cooperation. On
December 26, 2001, presidents Mohammad Khatami of Iran and Robert Kocharyan of
Armenia said Iran and Armenia have agreed to build up bilateral cooperation in the sphere
of regional security and stability.75
Perhaps to minimize the threat of an Armenian-Iranian alliance, Armenian
President Robert Kocharyan was quoted in 2002 as saying, „There is no serious military
aspect in our relations.‟76 He asserted that Armenia maintains good-neighborly relations
with Iran and both were working to strengthen trade and economic cooperation. And at that
same time he added that both countries are also working on plans to build a gas pipeline.
This pipeline is one of the best examples of Iranian-Armenian cooperation on economic
issues. The pipeline, completed in 2007, called for 100 kilometers of the pipeline across
Iran and 41 kilometers across Armenia.77 Through this pipe Armenia was projected to
receive 1.5 million cubic meters of gas annually.78
Turkey
Armenia has almost as troubled a relationship with Turkey as it does with
Azerbaijan. Turkish-Armenian relations have been frozen by three issues: (1) territorial
disputes, (2) Armenian genocide allegations, and (3) differences over the NagornoKarabakh dispute. Turkey has been a steadfast supporter of Azerbaijan‟s territorial
integrity, and leaders in Azerbaijan have expressed the belief that Turkey is the only state
that truly understands its situation with Armenia.79 Turkish support for Azerbaijan has been
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perceived by Armenians (in the homeland and among the Diaspora) as the continuation of
historical conflicts with the Turkish people and an attempt to “keep Armenia helpless and
vulnerable.”80
Just as with Azerbaijan, Armenia‟s Diaspora has played an important role in this
relationship. In particular, it has pushed foreign governments to recognize the events of
1915 as genocide. This is a dispute that even crops up in American domestic politics from
time to time, when the US Congress considers officially recognizing Ottoman treatment of
Armenians as genocide.81 The Turkish government has refused to acknowledge massacres
of Armenians as genocide, and Armenian accusations have evoked angry protests from the
Turks, creating an impasse to rapprochement.82
Yet Armenians are not all united on this stance. Turkish Armenians are the largest
Christian community in Turkey, with a population of approximately 70,000. Turkish
Armenians have often found themselves at odds with both Armenia and the Armenian
Diaspora, as they generally favor rapid resolution of Turkish-Armenian disputes, which
make their lives difficult in Turkey. Mesrob the II, the 84th patriarch of Turkey‟s Armenian
Orthodox community, has expressed the view that relations between Armenia and Turkey
have been crippled by the constant return to the issue of genocide. 83
If Armenian economic dependency on Russia is ever to be broken, ties with Turkey
must be established in order to open Armenia‟s trade routes. Efforts to achieve
rapprochement, however, have been fitful. In 2002, the Armenians agreed to open relations
with Turkey without any preconditions, but Turkey remained aloof, demanding that
Armenia halt fighting with Azerbaijan and drop claims to Turkish territory.84 In 2003,
renewed effort to create peace emerged as Armenia began to consider such concessions to
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Turkey.85 Later that year, Turkey announced it would consider reopening relations with
Armenia.86 When Armenia appeared in 2004 to have failed to honor these concessions, the
Turkish government announced that it would suspend relations.87
In 2005, the IMF emphasized that it is critical that Armenia normalize relations
with Turkey.88 Turkey, too, has incentive to reopen its relations with Armenia. For
example, the EU has suggested it wants to see their conflict resolved.89 In 2006, however,
progress has stalled again, with Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan saying that
Turkey does not appear willing to open diplomatic relations.90
Still, the shakeup caused by the Russia-Georgia War may offer opportunity for a
new round of negotiations. Improving the relationship with Armenia appears to be an
objective of the AKP government, and on September 6, 2008, Turkish President Abdullah
Gül visited Armenia to watch a football match between the two country‟s national teams.91
News reports indicate that both sides are also preparing for the possible re-opening of roads
across their borders.92 Additionally, there has been some talk of reopening the Kars-Gümrü
railway, a possibility that appears unlikely anytime soon, but one that could restore
Armenia‟s ability to facilitate East-West trade93
Global Powers & the Region
United States, NATO, & Armenia
In the wake of the Soviet Union‟s collapse, Armenia initially appeared to be in a
good political position vis-à-vis the US. The US initially backed the right of Armenians in
Nagorno-Karabakh to self-determination. This US orientation was facilitated by the
political influence of the Armenian Diaspora within the US. The openness of the American
political system allows ethnic political groups or diaspora groups like the Armenians to
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influence US foreign policy toward their homeland.94 For example, Senator John Kerry was
backed by a large Massachusetts Armenian lobby when he proposed the sanctioning of
Azerbaijan under Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act in 1992. At the time, Azerbaijan
did not even have diplomatic representation in the US.95
While Armenia succeeded in this first round of diplomatic battles with Azerbaijan,
receiving a great deal of US aid, its position weakened somewhat as the US came to
understand that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was not a one sided case of ethnic hostility
and realized the strategic value of Azerbaijan. Those strategic interests include
Azerbaijan‟s energy wealth and Azerbaijan‟s strategic location in regards to the War on
Terror.
Armenia‟s close relationship with Iran and its difficulties with Turkey also
complicate the US-Armenian relationship. Even recently elected US President Barack
Obama, who had previously argued that the events of 1915 should be recognized as an
instance of genocide, has refused to use the word in order to maintain strategic ties with
Turkey. Instead, he said asserted that this is an issue that Turkey and Armenia must resolve
themselves.96
Still the US has encouraged Armenia‟s participation within NATO‟s PfP program.
Since Armenia joined the PfP program in 1994, it has sent a contingent of troops to
Kosovo. In 2005, Armenia also received its first approved Individual Partnership Action
Plan (IPAP). Despite the possibility this cooperation might hold for mitigating Armenia‟s
security reliance on Russia, Armenia has been clear that is not seeking permanent NATO
membership.97
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The EU, OSCE, & Armenia
The EU and multi-lateral European organizations hold economic and political
promise for Armenia. As in the US, the Armenian Diaspora created a great deal of initial
European sympathy for the Armenia. In 1999, the EU-Armenia PCA first went into effect,
and in 2004, Armenia was offered ENP membership along with Georgia and Azerbaijan.
Its ENP action plan was approved in 2006, and Armenia has been pursuing the objectives
of that plan with vigor.98
In Europe, the Armenian Diaspora has used its leverage to oppose Turkey‟s
membership into the EU.99 However, Armenia has less strategic importance for the EU
than Azerbaijan, due to European energy demands. Instead, EU encouragement of
Armenia‟s participation in the ENP may be perceived as a part of the EU‟s long-term
strategy to create a stable belt of neighboring states.
In this regard, OSCE mediation of Nagorno-Karabakh has been an important aspect
of the European-Armenian relationship. The OSCE has been encouraging negations and
debunking accusations that might derail the peace process.100 Yet, progress has been
limited, and the OSCE has criticized Nagorno-Karabakh‟s attempts to achieve international
recognition of its de-facto independence.
Russia, the CIS, & Armenia
As Russia is the historical protector of the Armenians, it would be easy to
characterize the relationship between Armenia and Russia as friendly and mutually
beneficial. The relationship is, in fact, quite complicated. Armenians have historically
desired autonomy, and in return for Russia‟s friendship, Armenia has been forced to
surrender significant autonomy.
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Due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the first concern of Armenia was security.
In order to secure itself, Armenia agreed to allow Russia to maintain military bases within
its borders, and Russian troops have even patrolled its borders.101 Armenia is the only state
in the South Caucasus to have steadily maintained its membership in the CIS, and it has
embraced Russia‟s creation of the CSTO, hosting war games.102 Armenian‟s security
cooperation has allowed Russia to maintain a significant military presence in the region,
facilitating its ability to act a regional security manager.
After security concerns, the issue of energy has been salient for Armenia. Until the
Iran-Armenia gas pipeline was finished in 2007, Armenia had only Russia to supply its
energy needs. Russia obliged, supplying energy and investing in the Armenian energy
sector as it privatized. However, this has allowed Russia to dominate the Armenian energy
sector, and it tighten its hold on this sector by trading Armenian debt for shares in
Armenian companies. This relationship is likely to be long-term, and on June 8, 2009,
Gazprom announced that by the end of 2009 it would invest more than 200 million dollars
in the construction of the Iran-Armenian gas pipeline.103
The Russia-Georgia War may yet shake the Armenian-Russian relationship,
providing a warning of Russia‟s desire to permanently maintain its dominance in the
region. Yet considering the historical ties of Armenia and Russia, and the importance of
Russian routes and resources for Armenia, this appears unlikely any time soon under the
Sarksyan, who appears likely to continue in Kocharian‟s nationalist path. Thus far, RussiaArmenian security cooperation appears to be unshaken.104
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Conclusion
From this chapter, it should be obvious that geography has played a defining role in
shaping Armenian history. Consistently in close proximity to various empires, Armenia has
had to ally itself with great powers in order to preserve its independence. This pattern in
Armenian foreign policy still holds true today.
After independence the state that was the greatest threat was Azerbaijan. The Soviet
borders between these two states were convoluted, creating demographic overlap that
invited ethnic disputes. So, borders certainly mattered, but they mattered because they did
not reflect the realities of ethnic distributions, groups which had found the necessary
conditions for ethnic conflict in their troubled history and the threat of political loss.
Despite Azerbaijan‟s control of energy resources and major routes to Armenia, war
erupted along demographic lines. However, once Armenia suffered the additional loss of
routes with Turkey, it found itself in a situation that provided great incentive to pursue
friendly relations with Georgia. As a result, even nationalist leaders Kocharian and
Sarksyan have attempted to prevent ethnic conflict from developing with Georgia. So,
while demography has trumped borders, it appears that if routes and resources are scarce
enough, they may trump ethnicity as a geopolitical constraint on foreign policy.
By pursuing relations with Georgia, Armenia could secure access to greater energy
resources and routes with relation to Russia. It is intriguing that unlike Georgia and
Azerbaijan, Armenian nationalism has not led it to reject Russia. Both Azerbaijan and
Armenia have been compelled to seek external support for their war, and Armenia‟s choice
to return to Russia may appear a historically natural choice, since that state has long been
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Armenia‟s protector against Turkic enemies. But there is a geopolitical pattern, if one
compares the Armenia-Russia and Azerbaijan-Turkey alliances.
In order to understand this pattern, one must return to proximity and Walt‟s concept
of relative threat perceptions. First, both states chose to ally themselves with powers with
which they are not in immediate proximity. Armenia is separated from Russia by Georgia,
and Azerbaijan is separated from Turkey by Georgia and Armenia. The buffer between
these two states and their respective allies reduces threat perceptions, since it would be
difficult for either power to absorb Azerbaijan or Armenia. Furthermore, demography,
routes, and energy resources created an environment favorable to such an alignment.
Armenia shares demographic ties to the large Armenian population in Russia, just as
Azerbaijan shares demographic ties to Turkey. Azerbaijan‟s economy depends on the
Western consumption of its energy resources, and in the reverse manner, Armenia‟s
economy depended on energy from Russia. So, both states found it essential to maintain
routes to those powers. In the end, these geopolitical constraints meant that both alliances
were focused on routes running through Georgia, as is demonstrated in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: GEORGIA
Of the three South Caucasus states, Georgia is most critical to the region‟s geoeconomics. Adjacent to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia has the opportunity to serve
as a regional hub for trade and transportation routes. Georgia stands between the South
Caucasus and Europe, is the only South Caucasus state to have access to the Black Sea,
offers routes between the allies of Azerbaijan and Turkey, and also offers routes between
Russia and Armenia. (See Appendix F for a topographic map of Georgia.) If energy
resources have made Azerbaijan the most geopolitically strategic state in the region, then
Georgia‟s routes make it the most central. Through Georgia, Azerbaijan may reach out to
Turkey and the West, and through Georgia, Russia may be pinch off the West‟s tenuous
link to Caspian basin. The recent war between Russia and Georgia, then, holds significant
consequences for the geopolitical future of the region.
Geopolitical History of Georgia in the Caucasus
Pre-Soviet Georgia
It is difficult to speak of a single Georgian state until 1918, when all three South
Caucasus states gained their independence after the collapse of the Tsarist empire. The
territory of modern Georgia is the historical crossroads between the North and South
Caucasus. Georgia has experienced repeated invasions, the movements of various peoples,
and a legacy conflict between Christianity and Islam, between East and West. As a part of
the Byzantine Empire, Georgians became Christians. This heritage has persisted, although
Georgians have also experienced periods of Islamic control. Like the rest of the Caucasus,
the Muslims swept over Georgian territory in the 7th century. Following the Islamic
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invasion, the core of Georgia territory “was almost always divided into two primarily
princely states (Kartli/Tbilisi in the east and Ergesi/Kutaisi in the west) that were as often at
each other‟s throats over issues of royal succession as they were revolting against their
feudal overlords (Arabs, Persians, Mongols, and first Seljuk and then Ottoman Turks).”1
As such, the identity of the Georgian people took longer to develop than that of the
Armenians or Azeris. As Thomas Goltz has written:
“Indeed, what collective consciousness there existed of “Georgianness” is
open to question. The first time the word “Sakartvelo,” or “place of the
Georgians,” appears in the chronicles is 1008, during a brief and almost
coincidental unification of western and eastern Georgia under Bagrat III and
his mixed Armeno-Georgian-Abkhazian family line. That state‟s capital
was at Kutaisi; Tbilisi remained a Muslim garrison town, as it had been for
almost 400 years.”2
Christianity, then, has been one of the most defining demographic characteristics of
Georgians. As the Russian empire gained strength in the north, it offered the promise of
Christian protection against Muslim rulers, and just like Armenians, Georgians sought to
ally themselves with this new power. During the mid to late 18th century, the two primary
Georgian principalities turned to Catherine the Great at various times, seeking support
against the Persians, Turks, and even each other. In 1783, the Orthodox-Christian people of
Georgia decisively chose to embrace Russian rule, rather than submit to the Turks or the
Persians. Georgia‟s incorporation into the Russian empire, while not undisputed, would
position Russia to dominate the rest of the Southern Caucasus.3
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Georgia was completely absorbed by the Tsarist Russian Empire by 1801. From
that year onward, Russia would remain the most influential power over Georgia until the
end of the Cold War, or arguably even today. Georgia briefly gained its independence
between 1918 and 1921, as the Russian empire was torn apart in the Bolshevik revolution.
As Georgia attempted to pull away from Russia, it faced internal disunity, a peasant
rebellion among the Ossetian people who supported the Bolshevik Russians.4 This was an
early indicator of the ethnic heterogeneity in Georgia that would undermine attempts to
create a unified Georgian state in the 1990s. But when the Bolshevik army forcefully
brought Georgia back under Russian domination in 1921, the weight of the Soviet empire
forestalled such conflict.5
Soviet Georgia
When Georgia was absorbed into the Soviet Union, it was joined by the Soviets
with three different ethno/religious/political entities. The largest of these regions was
Abkhazia. The Abkhaz were not Georgian, and Abkhazia was a historically distinct region
that only became a part of Russian territory in 1864. After it was conquered by the
Russians, over half the Muslim Abkhaz population fled to Ottoman Turkey, which opened
the region for new Georgian and Russian settlers. Under Soviet reordering, which was
directed by Lenin‟s principles of national self-determination, Abkhazia was originally
federated with Georgia. To the south of Abkhazia, another Muslim region, Adjaria was
incorporated into Georgia as an autonomous region. Adjaria was an old Ottoman province
that remains heavily Muslim, and was ceded to the Tsars in 1877. Despite their Muslim
faith, Adjarians are actually Georgian by ethnicity. The third region to be granted
autonomy in Georgia was South Ossetia. Originating from Persian peoples, Ossetians
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intermarried with Georgians, Chechens, Russians, and Circassians. They settled on both
sides of the Caucasus Mountains (hence the current existence of North Ossetia on the
Russian side). Those in Georgia were granted an autonomous district, as opposed to the
autonomous republic of North Ossetia.6
Ten years after Georgia‟s incorporation into the Soviet Union, Soviet authorities
made Abkhazia an autonomous republic in Georgia, with similar status to Adjaria. Political
integration with Georgia and an influx of Georgian settlers caused anxiety for the Abkhaz.
In 1978, Abkhazia sought to be removed from Georgia and joined directly to the Russian
Republic. Yet, Abkhazian pleas fell on deaf ears in Moscow, and by 1991, Abkhazians
accounted for only 17 percent of the population in Abkhazian territory.7
Soviet encouragement of ethno-national identities during this time was crucial to
the separatist problems that Georgia would face upon its independence. The Abkhazians,
Adjarians, and Ossetians were given significant political autonomy, some of the greatest
they ever had. The political autonomy and nationalist identities that were encouraged under
the Soviets made it difficult for Georgia to create a new unified state. Nationalist tensions
only intensified in as the Soviet Union began to collapse.8
By 1989, tensions were on the rise in the Soviet Union and nationalist, but peaceful,
demonstrations in Georgia‟s capital city of Tbilisi were put down by Soviet paratroops.9
The leader of the Georgian nationalist movement was Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a political
dissident who had spent time in prison under the Soviets. In the Georgian parliamentary
elections of 1990, Gamsakhurdia‟s Roundtable/Free Georgia coalition won 155 of 250
seats in the parliament.10 That year, fearing absorption into Georgia and separation from
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their northern brethren, the South Ossetians declared independence from Georgia and
sought unification with Russia and North Ossetia.11
Georgia & Independence
Despite these complications, Georgian independence continued to gain steam and,
on April 9, 1991, the parliament of Georgia declared itself independent. A month later,
Gamsakhurdia was elected president with 86 percent of the vote. His election slogan was
“Georgia for Georgians!,” which did little to calm the fears of Abkhaz and Ossets.12 In
early 1991, the Abkhaz, like the Ossets, had expressed their desire to remain a part of
Russia.13 For their part, the Adjarians also proved reluctant to surrender political autonomy.
Adjarian President Aslan Abashidze refused to pay taxes to Georgia or to allow Adjarians
to be recruited for the national army.14
Ethno-Nationalism & Separatism
Gamsakhurdia‟s first order of business was to consolidate Georgia. For the most
part, he allowed Adjaria to maintain its autonomy while he focused on the South Ossetian
bid for independence. He terminated South Ossetia‟s political autonomy and moved to halt
Osset independence with force. The first round of conflict in South Ossetia was well
underway by October of 1991. But Gamsakhurdia‟s ardent Georgian nationalism alienated
not only domestic minorities but also Russia. He refused to join the CIS, perceiving it to be
a means of continued Russian domination, and he openly despised Mikhail Gorbachev and
his foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze (a native Georgian). This did little to endear him
to the West as well, which viewed both of these Soviet reformers with hope and
admiration. As Georgia began to disintegrate so did Gamsakhurdia‟s political control, and a
Georgian opposition movement led by several warlords forced him out.15
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Gamsakhurdia fled Tbilisi on January 5, 1992, but he did not give up his fight for
Georgia immediately. After fleeing to Azerbaijan, then Armenia, and finally to Chechnya,
he and his supporters organized a rebellion against the new president, Eduard
Shevardnadze. Shevardnadze had returned to Georgia following Gamsakhurdia‟s removal,
and was elected president on October 11, 1992. That election, however, was boycotted by
the Abkhazians, Ossetians, and Gamsakhurdia‟s supporters, and rumors swirled that Russia
was behind the recent change in leadership.
As Shevardnadze‟s forces moved against Gamsakhurdia‟s loyalists, Abkhazia made
its bid for independence. Shevardnadze opposed this move, and by August of 1992, his
forces were engaged with Abkhaz separatists. Despite the divisions between Georgian‟s
loyal to Shevardnadze and those loyal to Gamsakhurdia, Georgian forces initially gained
the upper hand and pushed Abkhaz forces back to the cities of Gudauta and Tkvarcheli.
The Abkhaz, however, received support from other Caucasus peoples, including fighters
from Chechnya, and soon regrouped. Though Russia denies having any involvement in the
conflict, there were also signs that the Russian military provided support to the Abkahzians.
There were reports of fighter/bomber attacks on Georgian positions, though the Abkhazians
had no air force, and even when Georgians downed a Russian MIG 29 with a fully
uniformed Russian pilot, Russia continued to deny its involvement.16
Finally, Abkhazian forces and their allies managed to surround the major city of
Sukhumi. Though Shevardnadze (who had been personally leading Georgian troops)
managed to escape, the city fell to Abkhazian forces. The Abkhazians then recaptured all
Abkhazian territory and drove Georgian civilians out. Between 1992 and 1993, 10,00015,000 soldiers and civilians died and roughly 250,000 people were forced from their
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homes. Shevardnadze‟s defeat also gave Gamsakhurdia an opportunity to seize power. It
was only by turning to Moscow and requesting Georgian membership in the CIS that
Shevardnadze was able to cling to power. In return, he received Russian tanks with which
to suppress the Gamsakhurdia‟s supporters. When the dust settled, Georgian nationalism
had been dealt a heavy blow. Shevardnadze‟s power was consolidated and Gamsakhurdia
mysteriously turned up dead (shot in the head in an act of suicide or assassination). Georgia
was returned to Russia‟s orbit, and Russian troops or “peacekeepers” enforced the disputed
Abkhazian and South Ossetian borders, freezing the conflict.17
After these early disputes, little headway would be made toward a resolution.
Russian intervention only succeeded in preserving the separation of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, resulting in de facto independence. OSCE mediation efforts have also failed to
bear significant fruit. In 1998, Georgian militias operating within Abkhazia again stirred up
violence, provoking Abkhazian forces to a military response in which around 200 Georgian
guerillas were killed and perhaps as many as another 50,000 Georgians were forced from
their homes inside Abkhazian territory.18 Skirmishing again flared up in 2001, and
Shevardnadze‟s apparent inability to protect Georgians in Abkhazia took a toll on his
domestic approval as a leader.19
Shevardnadze, who had come to power on the backs of Georgian warlords, also
appeared incapable of bringing an end to the rampant corruption and crime that had spread
through Georgia. Shevardnadze generally maintained the status quo, refusing to militarily
re-engage the separatists, staying on Russia‟s good side, and attempting to realize modest
economic gains without upsetting too many of Georgia‟s powerful warlords and criminals.
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These factors contributed to Shevardnadze‟s growing unpopularity among the poverty
stricken Georgian people.20
The ousting of Shevardnadze and the election of Mikheil Saakashvili in the Rose
Revolution of 2003, brought new attention to the separatist issue. In 2004, the nationalist
Saakashvili demonstrated his assertiveness, engaging in a “serious skirmish” with South
Ossetian separatists as Georgia cracked down on smuggling and the drug trade. Saakashvili
also managed to apply political pressure to bring Adjaria back into the Georgian fold.
President Abashidze opposed Saakashvili, just as he had opposed the power of all previous
Georgian presidents, but Saakashvili managed to enlist the political aid of Turkey, which
has possessed special political influence in Adjaria due to that region‟s Ottoman history, to
peacefully remove Abashidze from office on May 6, 2004.21 In 2006, Georgia also
regained control of the Kodori Gorge in upper Abkhazia after defeating a local warlord.
Under Saakashvili, however, Georgia also reversed its policy of isolating Abkhazia and
South Ossetia and began to seek economic engagement in order to bring them back into
consideration of federation with the Georgian state.22
In 2005 and 2006, the Georgian government also began to pressure Russian forces
to leave Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, Russia showed no interest in removing its
troops and both Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained hostile toward Georgia. In both
2006 and 2007, there were several reports of violence between Abkhaz and Georgian
forces along the border, including several rocket attacks by Abkhazians. Both Putin and
leaders of the separatist republics compared their situation to the Kosovars in Serbia,
essentially warning that Kosovo‟s independence would be perceived as international legal
precedent for their own right to self-determination.23
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By 2008, Abkhazia and South Ossetia had experienced de facto independence for
roughly a decade and a half, and their bid for internationally recognized independence only
appeared to be growing stronger. Not only did Abkhazia reiterate its call for the UN, EU,
and OSCE to recognize its independence, but Russia appeared to be prepared to strengthen
its support for both of these republics. Russia withdrew CIS sanctions which had been
placed on Abkhazia and the Russian Duma encouraged the Russian government to
recognize both republics as independent. Additional Russian troops were deployed in
Abkhazia, including a unit or units specifically tasked with the repair the Russian railway
with Abkhazia.24 Ultimately, Russia‟s decision to intervene in both Abkhazia and South
Ossetia meant that when Saakashvili attempted to take the offensive against separatists in
August of 2008 that these internal conflicts would blossom into an international war with
Russia.
Georgia, Economic Dependency, & East-West Routes
Torn by separatism and rebellion, Georgia‟s economy quickly disintegrated in the
early 1990s. The Georgian economy was built on Black Sea tourism; cultivation of citrus
fruit, tea, and grapes; as well as some mining.25 All of these sectors were interrupted, and
particularly tourism disappeared. Between 1992 and 1993, Georgia‟s GDP shrank by a
dramatic and crippling 80 percent.26 Once Shevardnadze consolidated power, Georgia
stabilized and the economy slowly began to recover. However, in the chaos of post-Soviet
Georgia, a shadow economy developed. Warlords and criminals undermined both the
economy and the government‟s legitimacy.
From 1994 to 1998, Shevardnadze began to take serious steps to reform the
economy according to the stabilizing and liberalizing policies advocated under the
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“Washington Consensus.” By 1997, these reforms had allowed the economy to gain some
momentum, reaching a 10-11 percent growth rate. The Baku-Sups oil pipeline with
Azerbaijan was a significant piece of this rise in economic activity. But Georgia‟s
economic recovery stagnated between 1998 and 2003, buffeted by the international
currencies crises in both Russia (1998) and Turkey (2000). By 2003, Georgia had “attained
only 73 percent of its 1990 economic growth.”27 This economic stagnation, combined with
Shevardnadze‟s failures with Abkhazia and his inability or unwillingness to counter
corruption in the country‟s politics and economy eventually contributed to his ousting.
Surprisingly, the Rose Revolution did not cause significant economic dislocation.
Economic growth reached 8.6 percent, and construction of the BTC pipeline continued
unabated.28 The new government under Saakashvili moved quickly to cement economic
reform, taking steps toward economic integration with the EU. At the same time, however,
Georgia began privatization in earnest. Russian companies moved in quickly and began to
buy up Georgian assets in the summer of 2003.29 Gazprom began negotiations with
Georgia for the gas pipeline that connects Russia to Armenia. These negotiations were only
stopped by political intervention by the US.30 In 2006, when Gazprom moved to raise
energy prices on Georgia, it offered to exchange lower prices for holdings in Georgia‟s
energy assets, as it had done with Armenia, and elicited accusations of economic
blackmail.31
Energy is a resource that is vital to Georgia and must be imported, creating the
opportunity for dependency. Practically all of Georgia‟s 14 tb/d oil consumption (2007)
and 52 bcf of gas consumption (2006) must be imported. About 60 percent of Georgia‟s
gas imports are supplied by Russia, while the other 40 percent is met by Azerbaijan.32
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While Georgia has resisted complete Russian domination of its energy sector (at the
prompting of the West, which fears Russian domination of this East-West route), Georgia‟s
economy remains highly vulnerable to external influence. Black Sea tourism catered
largely to northern Russian populations, and not only did separatist conflict disrupt that
industry, but Abkhazia‟s independence removed a significant amount of Black Sea territory
from Georgia‟s economy. Tensions with Russia have also resulted in trade sanctions on
Georgian wine and a ban on Georgian guest workers, which has strangled the flow of
remittances to Georgia.33
The most promising opportunity to escape economic dependency on Russia is by
increasing trade with along its East-West routes (primarily pipelines, roads, and rail).
Georgia‟s geopolitical position suits it ideally to provide an East-West corridor for energy
flowing out of the Caspian via Azerbaijan, as well as to tie the economies of Turkey and
Azerbaijan together. The BTC and BTE pipelines have opened the Caspian basin to the
West, and if trans-Caspian lines are ever completed to Central Asia, their oil and gas would
flow through Georgia as well. If Georgia can maximize its East-West economic orientation
while retaining its role as a hub for North-South trade routes, it has a greater opportunity to
diversify its economy. As noted, Georgia is already serving as a transit route for the
majority of Armenia‟s international trade, and if Georgia could pipe gas in from Iran, it
might further diversify its energy consumption.
The Rose Revolution
The greatest social/political shifts in Georgian domestic politics after the
development of separatism was the pro-democracy “Rose Revolution” of 2003. As noted in
the previous sections, Shevardnadze‟s popularity declined over his 11 year presidency
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because a combination of perceived failures in the handling of Georgia‟s separatist
conflicts, economic and security dependency on Russia, corruption, and economic poverty.
Most of the power in the Georgian state resided in the hands of a few elite gathered around
Shevardnadze.34 As Shevardnadze‟s popularity declined, he began to crack down on
dissent, attempting to control of the Georgian media. This further undermined
Shevardnadze‟s legitimacy and support for opposition parties began to harden.35
The opposition grew in such strength that when parliamentary elections were held
in 2003, Shevardnadze‟s party appeared poised for a major loss. Some electoral fraud had
occurred in previous elections, but in the face of almost certain defeat, Shevardnadze and
his party blatantly attempted to manipulate the election.36 This sparked national outrage and
tens of thousands of Georgians organized in peaceful demonstrations, rallied by the
Georgian media and supported by finances provided by Western donors.37 When
confronted by soldiers called up by Shevardnadze, the people presented them with roses,
greeting the threat of force with friendliness extended to fellow patriots. Many soldiers laid
down their arms, and the protesters were not broken up.38 When Shevardnadze attempted to
call his new, skewed parliament into session on November 22, demonstrators broke into the
parliament and forced Shevardnadze to flee. The very next day he resigned.39
Mikheil Saakashvili, the opposition leader who had led demonstrators into
parliament on the 22nd, was elected president in January of 2004.40 The results were hailed
throughout the West as a victory for liberty, re-invigorating Georgia‟s ties with the EU and
NATO. Soon similar democratic revolutions swept Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005).
At least in Georgia and Ukraine, these revolutions brought pro-Western governments to
power, a trend which Russia has eyed with unease.
102

The Russian reaction to the Rose Revolution will be fleshed out further in the
section on Georgia-Russian relations, but it is important to note just what bearing
democracy in Georgia has on this geopolitical analysis. The spread of democracy is
important to Russian threat perceptions because it is a part of a larger trend of Western
institutions encroaching (NATO and EU expansion) on post-Soviet space. This is an
increase in Western proximity to Russia and it appears to be accompanied by rising
Russian threat perceptions.
Georgia & Its Geopolitical Environment
Intra-Regional Neighbors: Armenia & Azerbaijan
Armenia
Separatism and ethno-nationalism are demographic issues that have had a
significant role in the Armenia-Georgia relationship. Georgia has worried about the sizable
Armenian minority that lives within its borders, as there has been a history of Armenian
attempts to unite with the predominantly Armenian region of Javakheti. When Georgia‟s
war with Abkhazia began, Georgia also accused Armenia, along with Russia, of backing
that separatist movement.41 More recently, however, Armenia has attempted to ease these
tensions in pursuit of a greater economic relationship with Georgia.
Georgia is essential to north-south trade routes between Armenia and Russia, which
has made it key to alleviating Armenia‟s economic isolation by Azerbaijan and Turkey. But
a relationship with Armenia would also be mutually advantageous for Georgia. First, it
would bring more trade to Georgia‟s rocky economy, and second, it could open a way for
the importation of Iranian gas. By extending the current Armenia-Iran pipeline north,
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Georgia could cement a trading relationship with Iran and reduce energy dependency on
Russia. This is a possibility that Iran favors, as a pipeline to Georgia offers an opportunity
to eventually connect Iran to Europe.42 As these two countries have realized a mutual
interest in routes, roads between Georgia and Armenia have been improved for trade.43
Since Saakashvili‟s government has come to power, relations with Armenia have
not only been seen as a way to improve trade, but also as a step toward working out
relations with Russia. In 2004, Saakashvili expressed this opinion, saying that, “…Armenia
can be of help to us, insofar as she maintains close ties of friendship with Russia.”44 Today,
there may be some hope in this regard. Armenia has maintained a very balanced approach
to Georgia in light of the recent Russia-Georgia War, and Russian transportation blockades
of Georgia have endangered Armenia‟s trade with Russia, providing a mutual interest in
the cessation of such Russian blockades.45
Azerbaijan
Whatever promise a greater relationship with Armenia might hold, ties with
Azerbaijan have been much more critical for Georgia. Azerbaijan not only provides
desperately needed energy resources, but the BTE and BTC pipelines also offer Georgia
routes from which it may gain not only financial revenues (from transit fees) but
international relevance. Serving as a transit state for these pipelines has certainly increased
Georgia‟s geopolitical value with the West. As a result, economic ties have grown strong
between Azerbaijan and Georgia. Georgia is now major a transit state for trade between
Turkey and Azerbaijan, and a Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway will soon be the next
addition to this trade corridor.46
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Azerbaijan and Georgia share also sympathy on the issue of ethno-nationalism and
separatism, a problem that has cost them both territories. Together, they have adopted the
rhetoric of territorial integrity over nationalist claims by ethnic minorities.47 They share a
wariness of Russian proximity and a general inclination toward orienting their routes
towards the West. Yet, Georgia has found that Azerbaijan has its limits in partnership.
While Georgia has been able to rely on Azerbaijan for emergency energy supplies when
Russia has cut off supplies (in both 2006 and in August of 2008), Georgia has found that
Azerbaijan is reluctant to take an overtly anti-Russian stance. 48 Azerbaijan was surprisingly
mute on the war in 2008, and though it did allow US Vice President Cheney to make a visit
in order to demonstrate the US support for its allies in the region, Azerbaijan has remained
aloof.49
Extra-Regional Rivalry: Iran & Turkey
Iran
The relationship between Georgia and Iran has been friendly, and relatively limited
to the diplomatic and economic ties. The fact that neither state shares a border, has
contributed to this relationship. At the same time, both states have mutual reasons to desire
friendship. At a 2001 seminar entitled, “Georgia between Iran and Europe” (hosted in
Tbilisi), it was noted that Georgia possesses a strategic location as a bridge between Iran
and the West. Only days before, Georgian officials were in Tehran to discuss cooperation
in trade, transport, and conflict resolution. Bernard Hourcade, head of the Iranian World
department of France's National Center for Scientific Research, said that Georgia‟s
economic difficulties and Iran's uncertain political future are the roadblocks to further
economic and political cooperation. Agreements with Georgia are attractive because
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Georgia is reportedly ready to grant access of Black Sea ports to Iran, opening a new route
to Europe.50 These discussions have continued and Georgia has expressed keen interest in
becoming Iran‟s link to Europe in the Great Silk Road transportation project.51
A positive relationship between Georgia and Iran could offer Iran greater access to
the international market and Georgia a chance to diversify its energy imports. Georgia has
imported gas from Iran before. When Georgia‟s pipeline with Russia was damaged in
January of 2006, it temporarily relied on Iran for natural gas.52 The Armenia-Iran pipeline
could open Iranian gas resources to Georgia permanently.
Despite the angst that a relationship with Iran might cause the West, Georgia has
not been bashful about its ties to Iran even in the midst of the crisis over the Iranian nuclear
program. On May 30, 2003, Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Kakha Sikharulidze said
about the US and Iran, “All the controversies between two states should be resolved
through dialogue” and “the hope is that the controversial issue of Iran's possible links with
international terrorism will be settled peacefully.”53
Although both states appear to have a positive relationship, during the RussiaGeorgia War, Iran maintained diplomatic distance. It took no official stance on the conflict,
except to express its desire that the conflict would conclude swiftly. This is because the war
contained mixed results for Iran. It, like Russia, has felt threatened by the increasing
proximity of NATO in the Caucasus, so the blow dealt to NATO‟s future in the region is a
positive development from the Iranian perspective. However, Russia‟s resurgent power is a
long term development that Iran will watch carefully as both states attempt to exert
influence in the Caucasus.54
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Turkey
While Georgia and Turkey have historically strained relations due to the legacy of
the Ottoman Empire, that past was put aside in the 1990s. Newly independent Georgia
developed political, economic, and security cooperation with Turkey. Turkey immediately
supported Georgia‟s independence and even stepped in to mediate the first dispute between
Georgia and South Ossetia. Both countries cooperated in the creation of an East-West
energy corridor, which culminated in the BTE and BTC. Between 1991 and 2001, the US
and Turkey donated at least 94 million and 13 million dollars respectively to fund Georgian
forces, and since 2000, both militaries have engaged in joint training.55 Turkey also
demonstrated its strong support for Saakashvili‟s administration when it intervened to
support the removal of Adjarian President Abashidze from power.56 As a result, both states
have issued much praise for the success of their relationship.57
Relations between Turkey and Georgia, however, have recently entered a rockier
phase. The impetus for this change is primarily Turkey‟s rapprochement with Russia.
Turkey now receives more than 70 percent of its natural gas from Russia, which has been
accompanied by growing trade and tourism. This resource dependency provides Turkey
with incentive to be careful in its relations with Russia, but the growing relationship also
appears to be based on a new convergence of political and security interests. Though
Turkey remains an important NATO member, Turkey is obviously no longer bound to the
US as it was during the Cold War. Both Turkey and Russia have opposed the war in Iraq
and desire to develop trade with Iran.58
More concerning to Georgia than an improvement in Turkey-Russian relations,
however, trade between Turkey and Abkhazia has risen. The Georgian Navy has attempted
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to intervene in this trade at various times, stopping Turkish merchant ships and making
arrests. This has created tension.59 The Russia-Georgia War also made it more difficult for
Turkey to maintain ties with Georgia and Russia simultaneously. In August of 2008, Russia
increased inspections of Turkish goods at Russian border crossings, which could cost
Turkey almost 3 billion dollars in the short term. Some have taken this as warning that
Turkey should be careful in pursuing a relationship with Georgia. While Turkey has called
for Georgia‟s territory to be respected, its officials have avoided criticism of Russia, and
have only generally aided Georgia passively, allowing US ships with Georgian aid to pass
through the Dardanelles.60
Global Powers & the Region
United States, NATO, & Georgia
Diplomatic relations between the US and Georgia were officially opened in 1992.
Since that time, Georgia has come to view the US as “one of the main international
guarantors of Georgia‟s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”61 The US has consistently
backed Georgian efforts to settle its separatist disputes without loss of territory, and the US
has provided Georgia with military training, economic aid, and diplomatic support in the
international community.
Energy, security, and democracy constitute the three major US priorities in its
relationship with Georgia. Georgia is a critical state for the establishment of East-West
export routes from the energy-rich Caspian Sea basin. The BTC and BTE pipelines have
opened this basin up to the West since the end of the Cold War. Following 9/11, though,
security considerations assumed the greatest priority for the US. Together, Georgia and
Azerbaijan form an air corridor through which NATO aircraft may reach Afghanistan, and
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now, “practically all flights between NATO territory and Afghanistan cross Georgian and
Azeri airspace.”62
In addition, the US and Georgia have initiated two major programs to improve
Georgian defense forces, the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) and the
Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP). Established in 2002, GTEP
invested 64 million dollars in developing Georgia‟s military capabilities, primarily for
counter-terrorism. That year, the US also sent 200 Special Forces to train Georgian
troops.63 For Georgians, it was another successful step toward escaping Russia‟s long
shadow. Eager to cooperate further with the US on security matters, Georgia reciprocated
by participating in the US-led war in Iraq, committing the third contingent of foreign troops
in that war.64
The real watershed moment in US-Georgia relations, however, came with the
democratic Rose Revolution, which swept President Shevardnadze from office. The 2003
election of Mikheil Saakashvili was hailed by the West as a great victory for democracy,
presenting Saakashvili with an opportunity to further ties with the US and Europe. Security
cooperation was soon joined by economic aid, and in 2005, the US initiated the Millennium
Program to encourage international investment in Georgia, committing 295 million dollars
to the development of infrastructure and the private sector.65 Furthermore, the US increased
support for Georgia politically, advocating Georgian membership in NATO.66
When Saakashvili gained the presidency, Georgia had already been participating in
NATO‟s PfP program since 1994.67 Though all three states of the Southern Caucasus have
opted for some level of cooperation through NATO‟s PfP program, Georgia has been the
most fervently involved in NATO cooperation.68 In Oct. 2004, NATO approved an IPAP
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for Georgia. Georgia‟s progress, then led NATO to invite Georgia to an Intensification
Dialogue in 2006.69 In April of 2007, the US backed further integration of Georgia when it
endorsed the NATO Freedom Consolidation Act, which proposed the admission of
Albania, Croatia, Georgia, and Macedonia as member states.70
On the doorstep of NATO membership, however, the issue of Georgia‟s separatist
problem came to the fore. The disputes with Abkhazia and South Ossetia have involved
Russian forces. Therefore, if granted NATO membership, Georgia would be able to call on
Western military intervention in its disputes, and war with Russia is not a prospect that
other NATO members desire to risk. As a result, Georgia‟s membership process stalled in
2007, while NATO sought the resolution of Georgian territorial disputes.71
Shortly after recognizing Kosovo‟s independence in early 2008, a NATO summit
was held in Bucharest. Cognizant of Russia‟s displeasure over the possibility of NATO‟s
expansion, Germany and several other European states opposed further integration, and
debate over Membership Action Plans (MAPs) for Georgia and Ukraine stalled. Instead,
NATO leaders made the weak pronouncement that Georgia would inevitably be admitted
to NATO at some point in the future.72 This opened the door for Russia to cement its hold
on Georgia while also providing incentive to act before that hypothetical point in the future.
The EU, OSCE, & Georgia
Like the US, the EU member states share an interest in Georgia because of energy,
security, and democracy. Unlike the US, however, the EU states require Caspian energy for
their domestic consumption. Even before the Soviet Union‟s collapse, Europe had become
reliant on Russia energy. The BTC and BTE pipelines, then, are essential to Europe‟s
energy security, providing non-Russian imports. Such diversification is a strategic objective
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for the EU, and it is pursuing plans to extend the BTC and BTE pipeline network across the
Caspian Sea, in order to access Central Asian oil and gas.73
The first EU-Georgia pact was signed on April 22, 1996. That PCA addressed
means to strengthen political and economic freedoms in Georgia, and was in force by July
1, 1999. Also in 1999, Georgia was admitted to the EC and the World Trade Organization
(WTO) with the backing of the EU. In 2001, the EU Cooperation Coordination Council
was created to guide the Georgia-EU relationship. Similarly to its NATO‟s membership,
Georgia‟s EU integration process accelerated under Saakashvili, and Georgia became a
member of the ENP in 2004. That year, the EU began a Rule of Law Mission in Georgia
(EUJUST THEMIS), signaling a new phase of cooperation within the European Security
and Defense Policy (ESDP) structure.74
Once Georgia was an ENP member, the EU began to exert itself more in regard to
Georgia‟s separatist problem. On February 21, 2006, the EU recognized the territorial
integrity of the Georgian state and voiced support for Georgia‟s attempts to find a
settlement for its disputes with South Ossetia. The next year, the EU launched a factfinding mission to determine the feasibility of implementing the EU-Georgia ENP Action
Plan in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This was seen as a step toward implementing effective
border control, establishing mutual ties, and reaching a peaceful settlement.75
In regard to security cooperation and dispute resolution outside of NATO, the
OSCE has been central to European-Georgian relations. Since 1992, the OSCE has had a
specific Mission to Georgia, committed to resolution of the separatist conflicts with
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. From 1993 on, the OSCE has played a role in monitoring the
Georgia-Abkhaz border under the UN led peace process. The Mission to Georgia also
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monitors the Joint Peace Keeping Forces (JPKF) in the Georgia-Ossetian conflict area.76
But the OSCE has had little influence over Russian intervention in those “frozen conflicts.”
Political analyst, Vladimir Socor has stated that the OSCE “can either function as a
„community‟ in consensus with Russia and remain irrelevant, or give up on the consensus
with Russia and risk ceasing to function at all.”77 This limit to European influence was
demonstrated in 2008 as, despite EU and OSCE efforts, the crisis in South Ossetia spiraled
out of control.
Russia, the CIS, & Georgia
Georgia‟s persistent distain for the CIS and its pursuit of integration with the West,
provoked negative reactions from Russia. Because of its geographic proximity, Georgian
membership in NATO threatens to create a gap in Russia‟s sphere of security, while
westward flowing pipeline routes threaten Russia‟s ability to monopolize Caspian energy
resources. As has been established, the primary threat to Russia‟s position as an energy
superpower originates in the Western energy corridor formed by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Turkey. This corridor even has the potential to be expanded by trans-Caspian pipelines to
access additional energy resources in Central Asia.
In order to secure its future as a global energy superpower, Russia has reasserted its
role in Central Asia and the Caucasus through investment in energy resources, security
organizations like the SCO and CSTO, and political partnership in the CIS. For Russia,
Georgia provides a critical chokepoint. If Georgia can be dominated, Russia can threaten to
cut NATO‟s air corridor into Central Asia, as well as Western energy routes. The problem
for Russia is that Georgia has done anything but rollover, particularly under Saakashvili‟s
nationalist leadership. The Rose Revolution and other democratic color revolutions like it
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(e.g. Ukraine‟s Orange Revolution) have unsettled Russia because of their pro-Western
nature. These movements have brought leaders to power who have sought membership in
the EU and NATO in a bid to escape Russia‟s historical domination. Georgia has
spearheaded such movements, urging the creation of organizations like GUAM.
Energy resources are not only a source of economic wealth for Russia. Oil and gas
can translate into political power. In 2006, Putin ordered a re-evaluation of the old Soviet
energy distribution and pricing system. Under that system, former Soviet Republics were
receiving gas prices significantly lower than the prices paid by European consumers.
Austria‟s payments for natural gas at the time were priced around $221 per thousand cubic
meters of gas per year, while Germany was paying $217, and Turkey $243. Former Soviet
republics, on the other hand, were pawing only $50-80 per thousand cubic meters.
Subsequent adjustment of gas prices for former republics like Georgia might merely be
seen as an attempt to develop even gas pricing that would deliver greater financial gain to
Russia. However, the timing of Russia‟s price hikes raised suspicions that new prices were
also designed to punish former republics for seeking greater autonomy from Russia.
Gazprom announced these changes in price structure just before the beginning of winter,
placing many consumer states in a budgetary crisis that threatened to leave their citizens in
the cold.78
In Georgia, however, Russia has another significant source of leverage that it has
maintained since that country‟s independence. Having assumed responsibility for
mediating Georgia‟s separatist conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia is able to
manipulate these internal disputes for political gain. As has been noted, while Georgian
nationalism may be blamed for the excitement of nationalist/separatist feeling among its
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minorities, Russia appears to have played a role in prolonging and even exacerbating these
ethnic conflicts.
When Saakashvili took a new, assertive stance toward Russia and the separatist
regions, his actions threatened to upset Russia‟s foothold in Georgia. Georgia‟s admission
into NATO would have raised the political costs of intervening in Georgia. Besides
Russian displeasure, the primary issue holding back Georgia‟s NATO membership was the
potential for future violence in the separatist regions. Thus, Russia began to tighten its hold
on Abkhazia and South Ossetia, contributing to this roadblock.
While Russia imposed a discriminatory visa regime on Georgia, it began to
distribute Russian passports to separatists. This strengthened Russia‟s ability to claim it
was acting in the region to protect interests of its citizens, and today 80 percent of South
Ossetians are now considered Russian citizens.79 In 2004, Russia also began appointing
Russian officials to serve as the heads of separatist security forces. Russian general Sultan
Sosnaliev and Major General Vasily Lunev have served as the Abkhazian and South
Ossetian defense ministers respectively.80 The proximity of Russia to Georgia‟s separatist
conflicts, then, is more than close; both separatist regions are now practically a part of
Russia.
Through 2006 and 2007, both Russia and the separatist republics maintained
pressure on Georgia. In both years, there were several reports of violence between Abkhaz
and Georgian forces along the border, including several rocket attacks by Abkhazians.
Together, Putin and leaders of the separatist republics compared the separatist situation to
that of Kosovo, warning that Kosovo‟s independence would be perceived as international
legal precedent for their own independence.81 In 2006, energy was also cut off to Georgia
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by suspicious explosions that damaged gas pipelines and electrical power lines from
Russia. Just months later, Russia declared a ban on Georgian wine (of which Russia
imports 80 percent), and when Georgia arrested several alleged Russian spies in September
of 2006, a full embargo was announced by Russia.82
In 2007, Russian intimidation continued to ratchet up. On March 11, 2007, at least
one unmarked Russian military helicopter (a Mi-24 HIND-E) launched an air-to-surface
missile at a building in Chkhalta. Then, on August 6, at least one Russian airplane violated
Georgian airspace near the village of Tsitelubani. That aircraft was identified as a Russian
Su-24M fighter jet, and it fired off a surface-to-air missile before returning to Russian
airspace. Though that missile failed to detonate, the event elicited angry reactions from
Georgia. For its part, Russia dismissed both incidents as plots to excite the international
community against Russia, claiming that these must have been Georgian aircraft. South
Ossetia, in the meantime, used the incident as an opportunity to request additional Russian
military support to defend against such Georgian air attacks. However, an international
team from the OSCE and the JPKF has reported that the aircraft in question originated from
and returned to Russian airspace and that the Georgian air force does not have Su-24M
fighters or the capacity to launch that specific Kh-58 missile type.83
In 2008, Abkhazia reiterated its call for the UN, EU, and OSCE to recognize its
independence, and Russia continued to strengthen its support for the separatists. It
withdrew CIS sanctions which had been placed on Abkhazia, and the Russian Duma
encouraged the Russian government to recognize both republics as independent. Additional
Russian troops were also deployed in Abkhazia, and a military was unit sent to repair the
Russian railway with Abkhazia.84
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Slowly and inexorably the separatists were being drawn away from Georgia and
into Russia in what has been described as a process of “creeping annexation.”85 On April
16, 2008, Putin ordered his government to open direct trade, transportation, and political
ties with both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This was followed by the deployment of
Russian paratroops and artillery in Abkhazia, as well as the repair of the railway between
Russia and Abkhazia by Russian troops. On July 15, 2008 Russia also began military
exercises in the North Caucasus. When these exercises ended on August 2nd, the troops
remained in North Ossetia, instead of returning to their bases in Pskov and Novorossiysk.86
When, on the evening of August 7th, Georgian troops began an attack on the South
Ossetian capital Tskhinvali. Georgia claimed that it was responding to rocket attacks from
Ossetia while Russia maintained that its “peacekeepers” had been fired upon. It is still not
settled exactly what happened in those early moments, but the Russian response was a fullscale invasion of Georgia. It was Russia‟s first invasion of another state since the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In the course of 10 days, Russia secured South Ossetia
and opened a second front in Abkhazia.87 When the relatively short war concluded, the
hope of Georgian NATO membership had effectively be quashed, as well as any Georgian
ambitions to militarily retake its separatist regions.
Conclusion
Of three South Caucasus states, Georgia has the closest proximity to Russia and has
experienced the most antagonistic relationship with that global power. The recent war with
Georgia has underscored the hostility in this relationship, and opened discussions on the
New Cold War because of Georgia‟s centrality between the West and Russia. Yet the
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conflict is not so much a replay of the Cold War as it is the culmination of historical
geopolitical tensions in the region.
When Georgia‟s history is reviewed, it becomes clear that Georgia has long been
defined by a high degree of demographic fragmentation. Now, this demographic
fragmentation alone cannot explain the development of conflicts, but Georgia‟s Soviet
history laid the foundation for separatism. The ethnic identities granted political autonomy
within the Georgian republic by the Soviets would move towards separation once Georgian
independence and Georgian nationalism threatened to degrade their autonomy. Once
Abkhazia and South Ossetia attempted to secede from Georgia, Russia was a natural ally,
due to its geographic proximity as the original grantor of their political identity.
In Georgia, as across the South Caucasus, borders have been a function of
demography, and where borders have not conformed with major demographic distributions
of ethnic groups in Georgia, there have been separatist conflicts. These conflicts have
provided Russia with leverage that it could use against Georgia as first Gamsakhurdia and
then Saakashvili have attempted to realize their nationalist ambition to shake off Russian
dominance. This is not to say that Russia has had control of these conflicts since their
onset, but Russia has obviously intervened in these conflicts and the result has usually been
positive for Russia. Shevardnadze‟s defeat in Abkhazia left him with nowhere to turn but
Russia. Thus, Georgia returned to the CIS under his presidency. Saakashvili‟s defeat in
South Ossetia in August of 2008, has crushed Georgian ambitions for NATO membership
and nearly obliterated hope that Abkhazia and South Ossetia will ever be reincorporated
into the Georgian state.
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The different foreign policy choices made by the nationalist idealists,
Gamsakhurdia and Saakashvili, and the pragmatic semi-authoritarian, Shevardnadze,
demonstrate that the geopolitical environment (specifically demographic distributions and
the proximity of Russia) do not dictate foreign policy but only constrain it. As nationalist,
Saakashvili, attempted to mitigate the Russian threat by pursuing integration into Western
institutions and cementing trade ties through East-West routes, Russia became increasingly
alarmed. This alarm may be seen as the function of proximity. Part of the reason that
Georgia‟s democratic revolution contributed to Russia‟s threat perceptions was that
democracy has gone hand in hand with the expansion of Western political, economic, and
security institutions (the EU and NATO).
The other part of the reason for Russia‟s alarm is that Georgia threatens Russia‟s
control of Caspian Sea energy resources by providing East-West routes for export to the
Turkey and the EU. Indeed, Georgia‟s central position for routes in the region is the
geopolitical factor that makes it critical for all of the states analyzed in this research. As
analysis of Georgia‟s ties to its neighbors, regional powers, and global powers
demonstrates, Georgia has been willing to pursue routes with anyone, which speaks to the
critical economic position Georgia has been placed in, particularly the need to find access
to non-Russian energy resources.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
The previously conducted case studies have provided a thick description of
historical context, geopolitical factors, and state leadership in the South Caucasus. Thus far,
each state has been dealt with separately, revealing the specific history and geopolitical
environment for each. Already common trends have begun to emerge, but now this
research will compare and contrast the findings of each separate case study in order to more
precisely define how geopolitical factors may influence the foreign policies of the South
Caucasus states.
Analysis of Variables & Hypotheses
Demography, energy resources, and routes will be discussed first, followed by the
variables of proximity and state leadership. Each of these geopolitical variables are
valuable indicators of where and with whom conflicts occur. Specifically, this work
proposes that the increasing strategic importance of these first three factors is correlated
with greater levels of conflict between international actors. Because proximity is defined as
dependent on these first three variables, as the physical distance of foreign powers from
those geopolitical factors, it is treated last. Then, state leadership is addressed in order to
test the explanatory power of geopolitical factors, as well as the proposed model of
research.
Demography
The variable of demography is defined as the physical distribution and composition
of ethnicities and religious groups in a state‟s population. Across all three case studies,
ethnic and religious demography is vital to explanations of where and with whom the South
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Caucasus states have engaged in conflict. All wars in the South Caucasus since the fall of
the Soviet Union have involved separatist conflicts that have been defined by ethic and/or
religious cleavages.
The importance of demography in these conflicts is why Grygiel‟s broad use of
borders as a variable is insufficient, at least in the South Caucasus. As a review of history
demonstrates, borders in the South Caucasus have been long been defined by demography.
Furthermore, when borders were established in the region that did not reflect the
demographic distributions of ethic/religious groups, separatist conflicts emerged in these
areas. The South Caucasus states do not merely need to establish stable borders in order to
project their power internationally. Georgia and Azerbaijan have both been faced with the
greater challenge of establishing internal stability in the face of major ethnic/religious
conflict.
Armenia‟s highly homogeneous population meant that it did not face similar
domestic disruption. This ethnic/religious unity in Armenia, not the status of its borders,
meant that Armenia was better positioned to project power in the early years after the
Soviet Union. This facilitated the decision of Armenia‟s leaders to project military and
economic power in support of separatism in Nagorno-Karabakh. It was also precisely
because of ethnic/religious demography that the borders of the new Armenian republic
were not acceptable to Armenians.
Azerbaijan was unable to pursue similar unification with southern Azerbaijan
(northern Iran), despite the desires of its nationalist leadership under Elchibey, because of
the internal crisis that separatism in Nagorno-Karabakh created. Leadership in Iran realized
this geopolitical reality and took advantage of it. Indeed, one of the reasons demographic
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cleavages are relevant to foreign policy analysis is the opportunity they afford for other
international actors to gain leverage within another state‟s affairs. This is particularly
evident in the case of Georgia. In Georgia, separatism was clearly defined along historical
ethnic-religious cleavages, defined nationalist tensions, and allowed Russia the opportunity
to gain leverage through the manipulation of those conflicts.
This research finds, then, that demography clearly offers an explanation of borders
and explains spatial patterns of instability. It also offers a better explanation than borders
for why states like Azerbaijan and Georgia have had difficulty projecting power
internationally. Additionally, Azerbaijan‟s case demonstrates that high degrees of internal
stability may be attained despite unstable borders. Under Heydar Aliyev‟s leadership
energy resources provided wealth to stabilize the country.
Resources
For the purposes of this paper, energy resources are defined as oil and natural gas.
Though Russia has invested in economic centers in the South Caucasus, it has been clear
that the most important resource in the region is energy. Across all of the case studies
conducted, energy is central to understanding where and with whom the South Caucasus
states direct their foreign policy efforts, either to secure access to or utilize the benefits of
energy resources. Natural gas and oil are vital to the South Caucasus states, as well as to all
of the other states analyzed in the case studies.
As noted, Azerbaijan‟s energy wealth has allowed it to make the most remarkable
economic recovery in the region and to stabilize its domestic situation despite unstable
borders. In contrast, Armenia‟s complete lack of energy resources has made energy
importation from Russia absolutely critical to that nation‟s survival. This has required
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Armenia to maintain friendly ties to the Russian Federation. Even when under idealistic
nationalist leaders, Armenia has not turned its back on Russia like Azerbaijan and Georgia
did under their nationalist leaders. Georgia too has been dependant on energy imports, but
because it was, unlike Armenia, free to pursue friendly relations with Turkey and
Azerbaijan. This allowed Georgia a greater opportunity to supplement its energy imports
from Russia earlier and in larger quantities, decreasing the cost of offending Russia.
Energy resources are also a constraint on foreign policy because of the interest
other foreign powers have in them. For example, Iran and Azerbaijan have come into
conflict with each other over the rights to energy in the Caspian Sea, a disagreement that
has come close to military confrontation. Energy resources have led the US, the EU, and
Russia to make significant investments in Azerbaijan and the energy infrastructure of the
South Caucasus, in order to gain influence in its exportation. This competition has spilled
over into the orientation of pipeline routes.
Routes
For the purposes of this research, routes have been defined as roads, railways,
waterways, airways, and energy pipelines. Just as with energy resources, this variable
appears to contribute to explanations of where and with whom the South Caucasus states
have directed their foreign policy. Routes are critical to securing access to resources like
energy, to establishing trade for economic growth, and for projecting military force.
The case of Armenia decisively demonstrates that as the number of potential routes
decrease, the possible foreign policy orientations of a small state decrease. Because of its
conflict with Azerbaijan and tension with Turkey, Armenia has had its routes severed to the
east and the west. This has straggled trade and cut off essential energy imports. As routes
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with Iran were originally quite minimal, maintaining all available routes to Russia, its
economy, and its energy resources became critical. Friendly relations with Georgia became
a necessity, then, inducing Armenia to renounce its claims to concentrated populations of
Armenians within Georgia‟s post-Soviet borders. That is a remarkable step that Armenia
has been unwilling to take with its either two South Caucasus neighbors.
Georgia, on the other hand, demonstrates that as the number and possible directions
of potential routes increases so do alternative foreign policy orientations. Georgia occupies
a central geographic location in the region, offering the best geopolitical position for routes
traveling north and south or east and west. This range of possibilities has facilitated the
decision of nationalist Georgian leaders to move away from Russia by offering means to
access non-Russian energy resources. Playing up its ability to connect Azerbaijan to its ally
Turkey and on to the West, Georgia has made itself indispensible to a strong Western
alliance in the region.
In this fashion, routes constrain foreign policy formulation by attracting the
interests of international actors. As mentioned, energy resource competition has led to
conflict over routes. Routes, however, are not only vital for just resources. Georgia has also
become critical to creating an air corridor by which NATO may gain access to Central Asia
and support its mission in Afghanistan. Westerward flowing pipelines and increasing
NATO penetration of former Soviet space have contributed threat perceptions in Russia,
which in turn has used leverage over Georgia‟s routes, energy resources, and demography
in an attempt to balance against the West.
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Proximity & Balance of Threat Behavior
This research‟s modified conception of Walt‟s proximity is the last and most
nuanced geopolitical factor to be examined. Instead of the mere distance between two
states (which relies solely on physical distance between borders), proximity is defined as
the physical distance of other states from a given state‟s energy resources, routes, and
demographic groups. Because the previously discussed geopolitical variables can only
provide necessary conditions for conflict and constraints on the foreign policy, proximity is
necessary to explain how the South Caucasus states react to international actors with whom
they have overlapping interests geopolitical interests.
Proximity not only contributes to explanations of where and with whom conflicts of
interest arise, but it also offers at least a partial explanation of why conflict has arisen. This
is because, as Walt has demonstrated, as proximity increases, the perception of relative
threat also increases. For example, NATO‟s PfP program, the interventions of the OSCE,
westward flowing pipelines, and democratic revolutions in the South Caucasus all increase
the West‟s proximity to Russia politically, economically, and militarily. This is an
important reality to grasp when explaining new tensions between Russia and the West
today.
Unlike the previous three geopolitical variables, proximity is completely focused on
the role of foreign powers in constraining the foreign policy formulation of the South
Caucasus states. First, this research demonstrates that proximity matters in regards to
demography. In all of the separatist conflicts in the South Caucasus, there has been a
correlation between the threat posed by external powers and proximity. For Azerbaijan, the
most geographically proximate state to the Karabakh separatists was Armenia. For Georgia,
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Russia was the greatest proximate state. In both cases, the geographic proximity of these
states facilitated their ability to interfere in Azerbaijan and Georgia, and their intervention
produced corresponding threat balancing behavior. This pattern can also be seen in Iran‟s
response to Azerbaijan‟s proximity to its Azeri demographic.
In regard to energy resources, it is interesting to note the correlations of distance
and threat perceptions. All of the South Caucasus states, regional powers, and global
powers have some sort of interest in the energy resources of the Caspian Sea basin. It is not
the overlap of interest, however, that has produced conflict. Instead, patterns of conflict are
correlated with perceptions of threat based on geographic proximity. Because of the close
proximity of Azerbaijan and Iran, these two states must confront tensions regarding the
division of oil and gas fields. However, Azerbaijan‟s energy ties with Turkey, a regional
power that is not in a geographic position to dispute Azerbaijan‟s energy resource rights,
have been positive. It should also be noted that Turkey‟s interest in Azeri energy resources
is driven by domestic consumption. Iran‟s interest is not driven by such a need. Rather, it is
driven by the desire to expand its energy holdings for its own economic and political gain.
At the global level, a similar pattern holds. Russia has had a strained relationship
with Azerbaijan in the energy sector because of the latter‟s deals with the West. On the
other hand, the EU has had quite positive energy relations with Azerbaijan. So, at the
global level, Azerbaijan has the most difficult relationship with the actor that possesses the
greatest physical proximity to it, Russia. And like Iran, Russia also does not require Azeri
energy resources to satisfy domestic demand, but rather has an interest in Azeri energy for
economic and political gain. It appears that major energy producers, at least when in close

129

proximity to one another, are more likely to have conflicts of interest than with powers that
are net energy consumers.
Routes are a significant part of international competition for resources in the South
Caucasus, and here too, proximity appears to matter. Since Russian resurgence under Putin,
Russia appears to perceive growing Western proximity in the South Caucasus as a threat
and is responding with according balance of threat behavior. Certainly, balance of threat
behavior has come to characterize the South Caucasus. The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict
led each to balance the other, cementing Armenia-Russia and Azerbaijan-Turkey
alignments. Georgia, because of its conflicts with Russia over the separatist regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, has been geopolitically inclined towards the AzerbaijanTurkey alignment and the West. Similarly, tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran have
inclined Iran towards the Armenia-Russia alliance.
State Leadership
Although proximity may provide some explanation of why certain foreign policy
orientations are adopted by state leaders, examination of all three case studies indicates that
geopolitical factors alone cannot explain foreign policy in the South Caucasus. Different
leaders in the same geopolitical environments have repeatedly made different decisions,
underlining the danger of adopting a deterministic, simple assumption of rationality on the
part of state leaders. If this work had assumed rationality of actors, it would be hard pressed
to offer an explanation of the different behaviors of Elchibey and Heydar Aliyev that were
seen in the case of Azerbaijan.
Elchibey‟s idealistic nationalism may easily be derided as an irrational policy
approach in light of the geopolitical realities that confronted newly independent Azerbaijan.
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Yet it reveals clearly that geopolitical variables cannot be used to predict a state‟s foreign
policy orientation without taking into account of the variable of state leadership. In the
South Caucasus states, hyper-presidential or semi-authoritarian forms of government
simplify the identification of the key state leader as the president. The short history of these
states and their similar post-communist experiences with nationalism facilitate the
simplifying of leadership types into two categories: pragmatic semi-authoritarians and
idealistic nationalists.
This research hypothesized that nationalist leaders would be more likely to engage
in conflicts over energy resources, routes, and demographies. Across all three case studies
this appears to hold true. In Azerbaijan, the foreign policy of the nationalist Elchibey
provoked tension with Russia and Iran. In Armenia, the nationalist leadership of Kocharian
saw little movement toward resolution of conflicts with Turkey and Azerbaijan. And in
Georgia, Gamsakhurdia and Saakashvili refused to defer to Russia despite the dire
consequences of such a foreign policy orientation.
Implications for IR Theory
Taken together, these findings demonstrate the significance of geopolitical analysis
as an evolving analytical tool within the discipline of IR. The geopolitical variables tested
in this research provide valuable explanations of where and with whom conflicts have
erupted. Further, proximity is relevant to explanations of why conflict occurs.
In the effort to integrate these findings into the body of IR theory, several important
corollary relationships may be explicitly stated. Demographic cleavages define the borders
of separatist conflict and are positively correlated with state perceptions of threat that
follow from the increasing proximity of foreign powers to separatist regions. Energy
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resources and routes define patterns of economic conflict and are positively correlated with
perceptions of threat that are related to the increasing proximity of foreign powers to these
strategic points. Finally, state leadership is correlated with the value placed on each of these
variables and the subsequent balance of threat behavior exhibited in a state‟s foreign policy
orientation.
This last point bears further explanation. Idealistic nationalist leaders in these case
studies tend to place greater importance on demography, relative to energy resources and
routes. This is particularly evident in the behavior of Gamsakhurdia, Elchibey, and
Saakashvili. Pragmatic semi-authoritarian leaders, on the other hand, have tended to seek
compromise with Russia in order to mitigate violence over demographic cleavages and/or
pursue greater access to routes and resources. This is why Huntington‟s attempt to explain
contemporary conflict through differences in civilizations (defined by ethnic and religious
boundaries) falls short, as well as why the assumption of rationality is too simplistic to
consistently explain patterns of conflict in the South Caucasus.
Considering this model of geopolitical analysis, a place for future research would
be a deeper examination of the role of individual decision makers. Not only might the
variable of state leadership offer a tie to political psychology, but this model might be
further informed by pursuing the link between political psychology and constructivism.
Already there is a growing movement in IR literature to synthesize constructivism and
psychology.1 The coupling of these approaches might provide fertile ground for future
research and contribute to the goal of mitigating the deterministic nature of classical
geopolitical approaches.
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Perhaps one of the greatest criticisms that could be leveled against the relevance of
this research is that the model is too narrowly focused on the South Caucasus. However,
when taken as a part of the greater developing literature on geopolitics, this work may be
seen as addressing an important gap in existing literature. Grygiel and others have already
provided wide-ranging assessment of geopolitical variables at the global level and across
history. This work should be seen as an attempt to refine the geopolitical approach for IR
today, particularly in relation to small states. That is why this model diverge diverges from
Grygiel‟s work on borders, discusses demography and proximity, focuses primarily on
energy resources, and adds the variable of state leadership.
As a final point, the relevance of borders may deserve more testing. Borders were
abandoned by this model because of the greater explanatory value found in both
demography and proximity. Future research utilizing similar methodology could test this
point. In order to maintain a parsimonious approach, however, future research should
attempt to provide categories of state leadership types that are tied to clear, generally
predictable patterns of behavior. This would maximize the predictive power of the model,
thereby increasing policy relevance.
Implications for Policy Makers
As stated in the introduction, this model of geopolitical analysis offers vital
information that policy makers require to effectively carry out their work. By focusing
attention on where interests overlap, with whom those interests overlap, and the
relationship between proximity and threat perceptions, this model supplies critical
information to policy makers about where to direct their attention. It also accomplishes this
goal in a vocabulary that policy makers can digest. Such research provides our policy
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makers with an explanation of how geopolitics provides incentive to pursue certain
objectives while constraining the pursuit of other objectives.
Furthermore, integrating the variable of state leadership into geopolitical analysis
warns policy makers against formulating deterministic models. By participating in
geopolitical analysis, the academy can define the concepts used by policy makers and
reveal their misuse as well. This is where critical geopolitics comes in, providing a critique
of geopolitical analogies and theories in order to prevent bias. Where the utility of
geopolitical analysis is limited, though, is in the prediction of how various regimes and
individuals react in a given geopolitical environment. Collaboration between constructivists
and political psychologists might contribute to the last part of this puzzle, providing a
greater explanation of the human factor in decision-making.
Conclusions on South Caucasus & Implications for the Future
From a geopolitical perspective, the South Caucasus occupies a geographically
uncertain space. It is a small region, comprised of small states, that has been surrounded by
larger and more powerful foreign powers throughout its history. The future of the South
Caucasus, therefore, depends heavily on shifts in this geopolitical environment.
In August of 2008, the Russia-Georgia War shook that status quo in the South
Caucasus and offered the opportunity for such a shift. Russia‟s victory in that engagement
tightened its hold on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This increased Russia‟s proximity to
East-West routes running through Georgia, routes upon which Azerbaijan‟s westward
orientation depends. Only together can Georgia and Azerbaijan serve as a western route for
energy exports from the Caspian. Continued instability in Georgia will undermine any
additional efforts to strengthen the economic potential of this east-west corridor.
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As recent coup attempts and political instability demonstrate, Georgia‟s
independence also hangs in the balance.2 The loss of Georgian autonomy to Russian
backed actors would only increase the Russian ability to dominate the geopolitics of the
region. Already, Russia appears to have succeeded in blocking the further intrusion of
Western security institutions into the South Caucasus. Georgia was the only state
realistically moving toward NATO membership, and that possibility was laid to rest by the
war. European states will not allow Georgia into NATO for fear of further violence
between Georgia and Russia. Georgia‟s exclusion from NATO also has made it
geopolitically inconceivable that any other state, like Azerbaijan, might be granted
membership.
Before the Russia-Georgia War, scholars and journalists were hailing competition
between the EU, US, Russia, and China in the Caspian Sea region as a New Great Game.3
After the Russia-Georgia War, this paradigm was replaced in popular discourse with
discussions of a New Cold War between the US and Russia. Yet today‟s geopolitical power
balancing in the Caucasus is not merely the result of competition between external
geopolitical powers. The roots of contemporary geopolitical balancing in the region are
deeper, stemming from geopolitical considerations originating within the Caucasus states
themselves, as their leaders seek to maintain the sovereignty of their states and grow in
economic, political, and military power.
The analogy of a New Cold War also ignores older, more accurate parallels that
may be derived from history. The conflict between Russia and the West is no longer about
ideology, nor is it necessarily about bringing down free markets (though Russia appears to
be taking a mercantilist approach toward energy). The conflict also does not appear to be as
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bifurcated as the Cold War, with the free world facing Russia and its satellites. Rather, it
appears to be a return to something more akin to the sort of competition for spheres of
influence that Russia participated in during the era of the Great Game.
Applying historical analogies is difficult and a function of how societies construct
both their history and contemporary international events.4 The Cold War is a natural
paradigm for Americans at a time when tensions with Russia are on the rise. Americans
have little other history of conflict with Russia. Europeans, in contrast, have a much longer
history of conflict with Russia, and therefore, are more likely to perceive current events as
merely the continuation of historical Russian insecurities. This can explain the differences
in how the US and the EU states have reacted to Russian resurgence. Balanced, policy
relevant research in IR, then, is more important than ever in regards to current events in the
South Caucasus – an uncertain place that has once again found itself in uncertain times.
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APPENDIX A: POLITICAL MAP OF THE CAUCASUS

138

Cartographer/Designer: Manana Kurtubadze
Source: UNEP/GRID-Arendal, The Caucasus Ecoregion, Administrative Units,
UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps and Graphics Library, http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/thecaucasus-ecoregion-administrative-units (accessed May 27, 2009).
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APPENDIX B: MAP OF THE PIVOT AREA AND THE RIMLAND
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APPENDIX C: TOPOGRAPHICAL MAP OF THE CAUCASUS
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Cartographer/Designer: Manana Kurtubadze
Source: UNEP/GRID-Arendal, The Caucasus Ecoregion, Topographic Map,
UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps and Graphics Library, http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/thecaucasus-ecoregion-topographic-map (accessed May 27, 2009).
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APPENDIX D: TOPOGRAPHICAL MAP OF AZERBAIJAN
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Cartographer/Designer: Philippe Rekacewicz, Emmanuelle Bournay, UNEP/GRIDArendal
Source: UNEP/GRID-Arendal, Azerbaijan, Topographic Map, UNEP/GRID-Arendal
Maps and Graphics Library, http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/azerbaijan_topographic_map
(accessed May 27, 2009).
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APPENDIX E: TOPOGRAPHICAL MAP OF ARMENIA
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Cartographer/Designer: Philippe Rekacewicz, Emmanuelle Bournay, UNEP/GRIDArendal
Source: UNEP/GRID-Arendal, Armenia, Topographic Map, UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps
and
Graphics
Library,
http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/armenia_topographic_map
(accessed May 27, 2009).
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APPENDIX F: TOPOGRAPHICAL MAP OF GEORGIA
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Cartographer/Designer: Philippe Rekacewicz, Emmanuelle Bournay, UNEP/GRIDArendal
Source: UNEP/GRID-Arendal, Georgia, Topographic Map, UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps
and Graphics Library, http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/georgia_topographic_map
(accessed May 27, 2009).
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APPENDIX G: DEMOGRAPHIC MAP OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
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Cartographer/Designer: Philippe Rekacewicz, Le Monde Diplomatique
Source: UNEP/GRID-Arendal, Ethno-Linguistic Distribution in the Southern Caucasus,
UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps and Graphics Library,
http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/ethno_linguistic_distribution_in_the_southern_caucasus
(accessed May 27, 2009).
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APPENDIX H: MAP OF DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFTS
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Cartographer/Designer: Philippe Rekacewicz, UNEP/GRID-Arendal
Source: UNEP/GRID-Arendal, Population Migration and Displacement in the Southern
Caucasus, 1988-2004, UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps and Graphics Library,
http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/population_migration_and_displacement_in_the_southern_
caucasus_1988_2004 (accessed May 27, 2009)/
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APPENDIX I: MAP OF ROUTES IN THE CAUCASUS
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Cartographer/Designer: Manana Kurtubadze
Source: UNEP/GRID-Arendal, Transportation Network in the Caucasus Ecoregion,
UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps and Graphics Library,
http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/transportation-network-in-the-caucasus-ecoregion
(accessed May 27, 2009).
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Initial Permission Request

From: mapmaster@grida.no [mailto:mapmaster@grida.no]
Sent: Wednesday, May 27, 2009 8:53 PM
To: Janet Fernandez Skaalvik
Subject: Maps feedback: About a specific page
FROM:
Nathan L. Burns, <NLBurns111@gmail.com>
ABOUT:
About a specific page
PAGE TITLE:
Azerbaijan, topographic map
PAGE URL:
<http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/azerbaijan_topographic_map>
IP ADDRESS:
132.170.100.189
USER AGENT:
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; GTB6; SLCC1; .NET CLR
2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
----------------I would like to request permission to publish this image in the appendices of my Master‟s
thesis. My topic is the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. Please respond if I have your
permission to publish this image in my thesis, I will provide the whole citation. I am also
planning to use several other images from this site. Do I need to individually request
permission for each?
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Initial Permission Consent

From: Janet Fernandez Skaalvik <Janet.F.Skaalvik@grida.no>
To: NLBurns111@gmail.com
Date: Wed, May 27, 2009 at 4:12 PM
Subject: RE: Maps feedback: About a specific page
Mailed-by: grida.no

Dear Nathan Burns
Permission to use the graphic in the manner stated in your message below is granted
provided UNEP/GRID-Arendal is acknowledged as the source of the graphic.
As GRID-Arendal is not the sole copyright holder of the graphics in our collection, we
would like you to specify the other graphics you need so we could advise you if additional
permission is required.
Thank you and best wishes
Janet Fernandez Skaalvik
Head of Communications
UNEP/GRID-Arendal
Tel: +47 414 99 472
Fax: +47 37 03 50 50
E-mail: janet@grida.no
Skype: janet.skaalvik
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Final Permission Request

From: Nathan Burns <nlburns111@gmail.com>
To: Janet Fernandez Skaalvik <Janet.F.Skaalvik@grida.no>
Date: Wed, May 27, 2009 at 4:52 PM
Subject: Re: Maps feedback: About a specific page
Mailed-by: gmail.com

Thank you very much for your prompt reply. If it is permissible, then, I would like to
request permission to publish the following additional 7 maps in my Master‟s thesis:
#1 - Map Title: The Caucasus Ecoregion, Administrative Units
Link: http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/the-caucasus-ecoregion-administrative-units
#2 - Map Title: The Caucasus Ecoregion, Topographic Map
Link - http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/the-caucasus-ecoregion-topographic-map
#3 - Map Title: Armenia, Topographic Map
Link: http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/armenia_topographic_map
#4 - Map Title: Georgia, Topographic Map
Link: http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/georgia_topographic_map
#5 - Map Title: Ethno-Linguistic Distribution in the Southern Caucasus
Link:
http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/ethno_linguistic_distribution_in_the_southern_caucasus
#6 - Map Title: Population Migration and Displacement in the Southern Caucasus
Link:
http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/population_migration_and_displacement_in_the_southern_
caucasus_1988_2004
#7 - Map Title: Transportation Network in the Caucasus Ecoregion
Link: http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/transportation-network-in-the-caucasus-ecoregion

Thank you for your help!
Nathan Burns
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Final Permission Consent

From: Janet Fernandez Skaalvik <Janet.F.Skaalvik@grida.no>
To: Nathan Burns <nlburns111@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jun 29, 2009 at 2:14 AM
Subject: RE: Permission to Use Maps
Mailed-by: grida.no

Dear Nathan Burns
Permission to use the 7 graphics you‟ve requested for your thesis project is granted
provided UNEP/GRID-Arendal is credited as the source of the graphics. Please also give
credit to the cartographer and include the link to the page on the Maps and Graphics library
where each graphic is accessible.
Best wishes
Janet
Janet Fernandez Skaalvik
Head of Communications
UNEP/GRID-Arendal
Visiting address:
Teaterplassen 3
4836 Arendal, Norway
Mailing address:
P.O. Box 183
4802 Arendal, Norway
Tel: +47 414 99 472
Fax: +47 37 03 50 50
E-mail: janet@grida.no
Skype: janet.skaalvik
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